Promising Culture of Dialogue to usher in reconciliation [Commentary by Theary C. Seng]

See Honorable Exit Strategy for Hun Sen, Commentary by Theary C. Seng, 17 Sept. 2013

Promising Culture of Dialogue
to usher in reconciliation

Theary C. Seng
(Kirirom, 27 April 2015 PM, edited and expanded 29 April 2015 PM)

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COMMENTARY
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This is a companion piece to the commentary Honorable Exit Strategy for Hun Sen that I wrote on 17 Sept. 2013, almost two months after the July 2013 elections during a period of high hopes for regime change, what I called the “Season of Cambodia Flourishing”.

That September commentary has received 1.9 million hits, a reflection of the desire for and curiosity at the possibility.

When the Cambodia Spring turned autumnal crimson in the spilled blood of the January crackdown, I really believed Hun Sen had missed his final opportunity to redeem his past by stepping down peacefully.

However, Sam Rainsy is adept in reading the political environment, understanding fundamentally the firm anti-Hun Sen sentiments across social and political classes, across the village-city divides.  He knows that Hun Sen knows this as well, despite the posturing and the accelerated difficulty in political negotiation and the growing public impatience.

In December 2013, Hun Sen reached his political nadir and must have seriously contemplated stepping down had he not been summoned to Vietnam by Big Brother for “political encouragement”.  He returned home politically armored and militarily confident, ready to shed blood.  In early January 2014, blood did flow.

On 22 July 2014, the Parties reached a political agreement, a tentative deal providing the platform for the culture of dialogue then yet a formless embryo to be given substance.  Serious questions were raised regarding the wisdom of Sam Rainsy’s appeasement of Hun Sen’s signature blustering and arrests of activists and CNRP members, whether it will not be politics as usual, as the technical groups worked to insert the National Election Committee into the Constitution. 

First, there was the marginalizing of Yim Sovann and Mu Sochua from chairing any parliamentary commission to the chagrin of the CNRP.  Then, there’s the odd insistence of sole Khmer nationality for any new NEC member, odd in that the requirement is a unique exception for the NEC that runs counter to existing practice where the King, the Minority Leader, the CPP ministers and Ambassadors, and National Assembly Members and Senators of both SRP and CPP hold at least one other nationality besides Khmer.  The matter took on an even more bizarre twist when the NA Permanent Committee, tasked with only facilitation in this matter, overreached and amended the understanding of the Parties and the spirit of the July 22 agreement in its application process by making it impossible for potential appointees even to renounce the other nationality for the political appointment.  In the meantime, civil society gasps at the newly amended Constitution for its unconstitutionality, particularly the provisions curtailing the rights and roles of civil society in election matters and the related punitive measures.  The excitement for the new Constitutionally-mandated NEC was greatly dampened by the second tier choices of members.

Serious questions were also raised in certain quarters regarding Sam Rainsy’s wisdom at his self-effacement in giving in to the demand of Kem Sokha to be the Vice-President of the National Assembly, a position that comes with a substantial annual budget and other perquisites, while he, the party leader, remains only a parliamentarian.  In a country where positional power and titles are still admired, even if quietly and emptied of substance, and humility scoffed at, it was an untenable situation.  After some time, he realized he will need a stronger formal position, outside the Government, in the National Assembly, if he is to implement the culture of dialogue with Hun Sen, and retain his authority vis-à-vis his still-yet fragile CNRP partner Kem Sokha and party members, particularly in the unknown terrain of implementing the culture of dialogue.  Thus, we saw the adept creation of the Minority Leader post where he and Hun Sen in theory could negotiate on equal footing.

Through it all, what is noteworthy was Sam Rainsy’s adamant adherence to the culture of dialogue in spite of the mounting criticisms from otherwise friendly voices, the tepid reception from his CNRP deputy and other members, and the testing by Hun Sen’s gamesmanship.  At the end (which is really only the beginning), however, his patience and self-effacement paid off.  He got the NEC, and as of a few days ago, Hun Sen’s admission that he could lose and Sam Rainsy could be Prime Minister, a first for Hun Sen and not something to sneeze at.

Hun Sen is now given another rare and FINAL opportunity by and only with Sam Rainsy.  I am hopeful of and support this "Culture of Dialogue", as the offer of reconciliation by Sam Rainy is genuine and I believe Hun Sen knows it's genuine (which is important and needed for it to be long-lasting). 

This offer is genuine and Hun Sen knows it’s genuine for the following reasons combined:

First, these former political foes know each other well and intimately during these past twenty-five years.

Second, the offer is genuine because it is personally and politically costly.  Sam Rainsy is extending a fig leaf of peace to a man who has repeatedly tried to kill him and in March 1997 almost succeeded.  Sam Rainsy has to convince continually his CNRP partner and other members and the general public that it’s worth the risk.

But mainly, the offer is genuine and Hun Sen believes it because Sam Rainsy has been consistent and insistent on this culture of dialogue and has willingly, without qualifications, shared the credit Hun Sen for its inception. 

Moreover, Sam Rainsy has time and again showed that he is a man for reconciliation and not revenge, first with King Sihanouk, then the enfolding of HRP (comprising of disgruntled former SRP members) into the CNRP (and those former disgruntled SRP-turned-HRP members now holding senior CNRP positions), and most recently his public photo with former legal nemesis Hor Namhong.  And during the recent political negotiation process, there were many moments when the CPP greatly tested the strength of Sam Rainsy’s conviction for this culture of dialogue, some identified above.  But rather than going with the expediency of the moment by breaking the dialogue, Sam Rainsy ironed out the differences behind the scenes with Hun Sen, oftentimes via Sar Kheng, even as he also appeased his CNRP members internally, all this time absorbing the public misunderstanding.

However, we still need Kem Sokha and civil society individuals like Brad Adams and myself to put pressure on Hun Sen to know deeply what is at stake for him and his family by reminding him of his bloody legacy which are documented and potentially part of a legal brief.

Yes, the stakes are also high for Sam Rainsy and the CNRP, but not as high as for Hun Sen.

What is at stake for Hun Sen and his clan?

First and foremost, the fear of reprisals. 

The main reprisal is international law catching up with him.  What appears inconceivable, say, five years ago, are conceivable—lawsuits in the international arena, and with regime change, in the domestic courts.  The shift came dramatically with the Human Rights Watch report documenting 30 years of Hun Sen.  The most unknown and notorious of his crimes are those of the K-5 genocide.  The report helps substantially to inform the international press and Cambodia watchers in bolstering what I and a few others have been saying publicly and what Cambodians know experientially regarding the Vietnamization of Cambodia and the crimes under occupation overshadowed by the crimes of the Khmer Rouge.  Additionally, the report gives further strength to the possibility of lawsuits at the International Criminal Court represented by Morton Sklar and Richard Rogers. 

In one masterstroke, Hun Sen could make all serious reprisals obsolete by accepting Sam Rainsy’s offer of reconciliation by genuinely reforming and making way to step down peacefully.  Any lawsuit will be greatly deflated with a genuine reconciliation.

Second, Hun Sen’s bloody legacy of the past 30 years can be redeemed; his children’s future is given a cleaner start.  And this can only happened with reconciliation and the peaceful transfer of power.

Even if hopeful, the situation is still new and premature to ascertain whether it will be a South Africa-like transformative moment, whether Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy could be Cambodia's Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem De Klerk.  The question is for Hun Sen.  The redemption is for Hun Sen alone, even if the fruits will flow to the larger Khmer society.  There is no one in the present or the foreseeable future besides Sam Rainsy who could make it happen.  It could be Hun Sen’s masterstroke of redemption or the final nail in his coffin of national betrayal with possible legal consequences.  The choice is his alone, even if Sam Rainsy is doing all he can to facilitate and ease the making of this choice.