
What if PTSD Is More
Physical Than Psychological?
A new study supports what a small group of military researchers has
suspected for decades: that modern warfare destroys the brain.
suspected for decades: that modern warfare destroys the brain.
New York Times Magazine | 10 June 2016
In early 2012, a neuropathologist
named Daniel Perl was examining a slide of human brain tissue when he
saw something odd and unfamiliar in the wormlike squiggles and folds. It
looked like brown dust; a distinctive pattern of tiny scars. Perl was
intrigued. At 69, he had examined 20,000 brains over a four-decade
career, focusing mostly on Alzheimer’s and other degenerative disorders.
He had peered through his microscope at countless malformed proteins
and twisted axons. He knew as much about the biology of brain disease as
just about anyone on earth. But he had never seen anything like this.
The
brain under Perl’s microscope belonged to an American soldier who had
been five feet away when a suicide bomber detonated his belt of
explosives in 2009. The soldier survived the blast, thanks to his body
armor, but died two years later of an apparent drug overdose after
suffering symptoms that have become the hallmark of the recent wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan: memory loss, cognitive problems, inability to
sleep and profound, often suicidal depression. Nearly 350,000 service
members have been given a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury over the
past 15 years, many of them from blast exposure. The real number is
likely to be much higher, because so many who have enlisted are too
proud to report a wound that remains invisible.
For
years, many scientists have assumed that explosive blasts affect the
brain in much the same way as concussions from football or car
accidents. Perl himself was a leading researcher on chronic traumatic
encephalopathy, or C.T.E., which has caused dementia in N.F.L. players.
Several veterans who died after suffering blast wounds have in fact
developed C.T.E. But those veterans had other, nonblast injuries too. No
one had done a systematic post-mortem study of blast-injured troops.
That was exactly what the Pentagon asked Perl to do in 2010, offering
him access to the brains they had gathered for research. It was a rare
opportunity, and Perl left his post as director of neuropathology at the
medical school at Mount Sinai to come to Washington.
Perl
and his lab colleagues recognized that the injury that they were
looking at was nothing like concussion. The hallmark of C.T.E. is an
abnormal protein called tau, which builds up, usually over years,
throughout the cerebral cortex but especially in the temporal lobes,
visible across the stained tissue like brown mold. What they found in
these traumatic-brain-injury cases was totally different: a dustlike
scarring, often at the border between gray matter (where synapses
reside) and the white matter that interconnects it. Over the following
months, Perl and his team examined several more brains of service
members who died well after their blast exposure, including a highly
decorated Special Operations Forces soldier who committed suicide. All
of them had the same pattern of scarring in the same places, which
appeared to correspond to the brain’s centers for sleep, cognition and
other classic brain-injury trouble spots.
Then
came an even more surprising discovery. They examined the brains of two
veterans who died just days after their blast exposure and found
embryonic versions of the same injury, in the same areas, and the
development of the injuries seemed to match the time elapsed since the
blast event. Perl and his team then compared the damaged brains with
those of people who suffered ordinary concussions and others who had
drug addictions (which can also cause visible brain changes) and a final
group with no injuries at all. No one in these post-mortem control
groups had the brown-dust pattern.
Perl’s findings, published in the scientific journal The Lancet Neurology,
may represent the key to a medical mystery first glimpsed a century ago
in the trenches of World War I. It was first known as shell shock, then
combat fatigue and finally PTSD, and in each case, it was almost
universally understood as a psychic rather than a physical affliction.
Only in the past decade or so did an elite group of neurologists,
physicists and senior officers begin pushing back at a military
leadership that had long told recruits with these wounds to “deal with
it,” fed them pills and sent them back into battle.
If
Perl’s discovery is confirmed by other scientists — and if one of
blast’s short-term signatures is indeed a pattern of scarring in the
brain — then the implications for the military and for society at large
could be vast. Much of what has passed for emotional trauma may be
reinterpreted, and many veterans may step forward to demand recognition
of an injury that cannot be definitively diagnosed until after death.
There will be calls for more research, for drug trials, for better
helmets and for expanded veteran care. But these palliatives are
unlikely to erase the crude message that lurks, unavoidable, behind
Perl’s discovery: Modern warfare destroys your brain.
The physics behind
blast forces was almost unknown until the modern era, and it remains so
mysterious and terrifying that scientists sometimes invoke the word
“magic” when talking about it. A blast begins simply: A detonator turns a
lump of solid matter into a deadly fireball. Within that moment, three
distinct things happen. The first is the blast wave, a wall of static
pressure traveling outward in all directions faster than the speed of
sound. Next, a blast wind fills the void and carries with it any objects
it encounters. This is the most manifestly destructive part of the
blast, capable of hurling cars, people and shrapnel against buildings
and roadsides. The remaining effects include fire and toxic gases, which
can sear, poison and asphyxiate anyone within range.
The
effects of all of this on the human body are myriad and more
complicated than the blast itself. People who have been exposed to
blasts at close range usually describe it as an overpowering, full-body
experience unlike anything they have ever known. Many soldiers do not
recall the moment of impact: it gets lost in the flash of light, the
deafening sound or unconsciousness. Those who do remember it often speak
of a simultaneous punching and squeezing effect, a feeling at once
generalized and intensely violent, as if someone had put a board against
your body and then struck it with dozens of hammers. From a distance, a
blast makes a distinctive thump, the sound of air pressure clapping
outward. When I lived in Baghdad, reporting for this newspaper, I would
sometimes be awakened by that sound early in the morning. I would sit up
in bed, instantly alert, with a surreal and awful realization: Someone
who was just as healthy as me 30 seconds ago has been shredded to
pieces.
Trinitrotoluene,
or TNT, was first used in artillery shells by the German Army in 1902.
Soon after the First World War started in 1914, a rain of these devices
was falling on the hapless men on each side of the front. It was a level
of violence and horror far beyond the cavalry charges of earlier wars.
Very quickly, soldiers began emerging with bizarre symptoms; they
shuddered and gibbered or became unable to speak at all. Many observers
were struck by the apparent capacity of these blasts to kill and maim
without leaving any visible trace. The British journalist Ellis
Ashmead-Bartlett famously described the sight of seven Turks at
Gallipoli in 1915, sitting together with their rifles across their
knees: “One man has his arm across the neck of his friend and a smile on
his face as if they had been cracking a joke when death overwhelmed
them. All now have the appearance of being merely asleep; for of the
several I can only see one who shows any outward injury.”
For
those who survived a blast and suffered the mysterious symptoms,
soldiers quickly coined their own phrase: shell shock. One period lyric
went like this:
Perhaps you’re broke and paralyzed
Perhaps your memory goes
But it’s only just called shell shock
For you’ve nothing there that shows.
One
British doctor, Frederick Mott, believed the shock was caused by a
physical wound and proposed dissecting the brains of men who suffered
from it. He even had some prescient hunches about the mechanism of
blast’s effects: the compression wave, the concussion and the toxic
gases. In a paper published in The Lancet in February 1916, he posited a
“physical or chemical change and a break in the links of the chain of
neurons which subserve a particular function.” Mott might not have seen
anything abnormal in the soldiers’ brains, even if he had examined them
under a microscope; neuropathology was still in its infancy. But his
prophetic intuitions made him something of a hero to Perl.
Mott’s
views were soon eclipsed by those of other doctors who saw shell shock
more as a matter of emotional trauma. This was partly a function of the
intellectual climate; Freud and other early psychologists had recently
begun sketching provocative new ideas about how the mind responds to
stress. Soldiers suffering from shell shock were often described as
possessing “a neuropathic tendency or inheritance” or even a lack of
manly vigor and patriotic spirit. Many shell-shock victims were derided
as shirkers; some were even sentenced to death by firing squad after
fleeing the field in a state of mental confusion.
This
consensus held sway for decades, even as the terminology shifted,
settling in 1980 on “post-traumatic stress disorder,” a coinage tailored
to the unique social and emotional strain of returning veterans of the
war in Vietnam. No one doubted that blasts had powerful and mysterious
effects on the body, and starting in 1951, the U.S. government
established the Blast Overpressure Program to observe the effects of
large explosions, including atomic bombs, on living tissue. One of my
uncles recalls standing in the Nevada desert as an Army private in 1955,
taking photographs of a nuclear blast amid a weird landscape of test
objects: cars, houses and mannequins in Chinese and Soviet military
uniforms. At the time, scientists believed blasts would mainly affect
air pockets in the body like the lungs, the digestive system and the
ears. Few asked what it would mean for the body’s most complex and
vulnerable organ.
Only after yet another
European war broke out did scientists begin looking again at blast’s
effects on the brain. When the Balkans collapsed into fratricidal
violence in the early 1990s, Ibolja Cernak, a small, tenacious woman who
grew up in the countryside of what is now Serbia, was working as a
doctor and researcher at a military hospital in Belgrade. She soon began
seeing large numbers of soldiers with blast trauma, usually from
mortars and artillery fire, a common feature of that war. As in World
War I, the men often suffered from striking mental impairments but few
visible wounds. Cernak, whose colleagues call her Ibi, has an appealing
blend of briskness and warmth, along with a clinician’s conviction that
you must listen to your patients. It is easy to imagine her running
around the battlefields of Bosnia and Serbia, collecting blood samples
from soldiers. That is what she did for several years, at no small risk
to her life, for a study cataloging the neurological effects of blast on
1,300 recruits. “The blast covers the entire body,” she told me. “It
has a squeezing effect. Ask soldiers what they felt: The first thing
they say is that their ears were popped out, they were gasping for air,
like some huge fist is squeezing them. The entire body is involved in
that interaction.”
Cernak
became convinced that blast ripples through the body like rings on a
pond’s surface. Its speed changes when it encounters materials of
different density, like air pockets or the border between the brain’s
gray and white matter, and can inflict greater damage in those places.
As it happens, physicists would later theorize some very similar models
for how blast damages the brain. Several possibilities have now been
explored, including surges of blood upward from the chest; shearing
loads on brain tissue; and the brain bouncing back and forth inside the
skull, as happens with concussion. Charles Needham, a renowned authority
on blast physics, told me post-mortems on blast injuries have lent some
support to all of those theories, and the truth may be that several are
at play simultaneously.
A
decade after her initial battlefield surveys in the Balkans, Cernak
took a position at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where she did
animal research that bolstered her conviction about blast’s full-body
effects. She found that even if an animal’s head is protected during a
blast, the brain can sustain damage, because the blast wave transfers
through the body via blood and tissue. Cernak also came to believe that
blast injuries to the brain were cumulative and that even small
explosions with no discernible effects could, if repeated, produce
terrible and irreversible damage. Much of this would later be confirmed
by other scientists.
It
was not until 2001, when America embarked on what became an era of
constant warfare, that doctors began to move slowly toward Cernak’s way
of thinking. A new generation of more powerful roadside bombs —
improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.s, in military parlance — became a
signature of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, yielding an epidemic
of blast injury. Medics soon noticed an oddity of blast: It reflects
off hard surfaces and multiplies, so that people who appear to be
protected inside an enclosed space like a Humvee often suffer much worse
brain injuries than those outside. Military and civilian researchers
began focusing their work on the brain rather than just the body. But it
was still very difficult to isolate blast from all the other physical
and mental effects of being exposed to an explosion in a combat zone.
A
landmark advance came in 2007, when an engineering firm called Applied
Research Associates received a call from the SWAT team of the Arapahoe
County Sheriff’s Office in Colorado. The officers were worried about
possible neurological effects from breaching, the practice of blowing
open doors with small explosive charges. Almost every major city in the
United States has breacher teams, as do militaries in war zones. The
Applied Research team quickly recognized that monitoring breachers would
allow them to observe blast in its pure form, because the charges are
too small to knock soldiers over or give them concussions; they are
subject to the blast wave only. Plus, the researchers could bypass any
ethical concerns about running tests on human subjects, because the
breachers were doing it anyway.
The
Applied Research team quickly designed and led a study on military
breachers, rigging its own blast gauges and subjecting the recruits and
trainers to neuropsychological tests at the beginning and end of a
two-week breaching course. The resulting report, circulated in 2008,
found a small but distinct decline in performance among the instructors,
who are exposed to far more blasts than students. It was only a pilot
study, but one author, Leanne Young, told me it added to “converging
evidence that there is a cumulative effect with chronic exposure to
blast,” even at relatively low levels.
The
military was still reluctant to take blast seriously or even to concede
that the symptoms it caused were a matter of physical harm. As late as
2008, researchers at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
published a paper suggesting that the symptoms of traumatic brain injury
could be caused in large part by PTSD and brushing off “theoretical
concern” about neurological effects of the blast wave. By that time,
American doctors who had gained Cernak’s unusual blend of medical
expertise and battle experience were starting to draw their own
conclusions.
One of the first
to challenge the military from within was a 44-year-old Army lieutenant
colonel named Christian Macedonia. In March 2008, Macedonia was in
Arlington, Va., listening to a group of scientists and government
bureaucrats talk about roadside bombs. The talk was dry and technical,
and finally Macedonia, a square-jawed man with an air of urgent candor,
could no longer contain himself. He lashed out against the military’s
inaction on brain injury, using what he recalls as “some pretty salty
language” to make his point. “I see no movement, and I’m kind of sick of
it,” he concluded. As the meeting broke up, Macedonia expected other
participants to politely avoid him. Instead, a younger aide approached,
gave him a business card and urged him to get in touch with Adm. Michael
Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Macedonia contacted
Mullen and repeated his pitch. To his surprise, Mullen hired him.
At
the time, “you had an entrenched military-medical community that did
not want to go down that road,” Macedonia told me. “They didn’t want to
give any credence to the idea that these symptoms were anything other
than emotional difficulty.” Macedonia, an obstetrician as well as a
soldier, knew otherwise. He did a tour in Anbar province in Iraq in 2004
and 2005 with soldiers who were being targeted frequently by mortars
and roadside bombs. As an officer and doctor, he felt responsible for
younger soldiers and their injuries. “Kids exposed to explosions were
asking for help, and I was mouthing the party line: ‘You’ll be O.K.’ I
was part of the machine that didn’t help. That’s what haunts me.”
Like
Macedonia, some senior officers, including Gen. Peter Chiarelli of the
Army and Gen. James Amos of the Marines, were also frustrated. They had
seen too many soldiers discharged for disciplinary issues that were
related to brain injury. Mullen hired several other experts to join
Macedonia, asking them to monitor and improve the treatment of brain
injury across the entire military. They called it the “Gray Team” —
partly a play on gray matter and partly because the men were mostly in
their 40s and going gray. They were an extraordinary group: mostly
military officers, all of them had advanced degrees in medicine or
science. And almost all of them had seen combat.
One
of them was Jim Hancock, an emergency physician and Navy captain whose
main qualification, he told me, was that he had suffered a traumatic
brain injury himself, in southern Afghanistan. He also suffered
concussions twice as a college athlete, so he had a basis for
comparison. “The theory at the time was, it was a concussive event,”
Hancock told me. “I said, ‘B.S.’ I’ve been concussed. I’ve never had
anything like blast.” Like other members of the team, Hancock had
noticed that soldiers exposed to blasts often had memory and focus
problems that did not go away and that seemed distinct from battlefield
trauma. If the blasts were repeated, the lapses sometimes devolved into
career-ending mental and behavioral struggles. The Gray Team shared a
gut-level belief that a blast wave’s effects on the body were far more
extreme, and more complex, than the concussion model could account for.
But their main task was to push the military to take brain injury more
seriously, whatever its causes.
In
early 2009, the Gray Team’s first five members traveled to military
bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, meeting with trauma surgeons and other
doctors to see how they handled brain injury. They found a wildly
inconsistent picture. There were three extraordinary doctors who
understood brain trauma and how to handle it. But “our fear was, those
three rotate out, and it disappears,” said Dr. Geoffrey Ling, another
member of the Gray Team.
When
they got home, the team identified the most valuable practices and,
along with Chiarelli and Amos, had them codified. Any soldier who was
within 50 meters of a blast or who was in a vehicle behind or ahead of
one struck by a bomb would have to be screened for brain injury. Anyone
who suffered a concussion would have to be pulled out of combat. The
Gray Team used a checklist to help identify concussed soldiers, although
they were soon forced to write six different versions of it, because so
many Marines memorized the correct answers to avoid being pulled out of
combat. They also found a civilian contractor to build blast gauges,
like the ones used in the breacher study. Every recruit or officer in a
combat zone now wears three of these tiny devices, which weigh 20 grams
each. The gauges are designed to turn red if they register a force of
more than 12 pounds per square inch, the lower limit indicating a
possible concussion or brain injury. The soldiers can no longer brush it
off: If your sensor is red, you must be screened for brain injury.
The
military has taken the new rules seriously. Less than a year after its
first tour, the Gray Team went out to the field again and found that 90
percent of the bases they visited were in compliance. Still, the larger
question of blast’s residue inside the skull remained a mystery.
Brandon Matthews is
built like a tank, with huge humps of muscle outlining his back and
shoulders. Ugly scars run down his biceps and forearms, cutting deep
creases into the muscle. Others line his legs and sides, the legacy of
an 11-year career as an Army Ranger. Matthews, registered with the
military as Brandon Matthew Sipp, was exposed to so many blasts, in Iraq
and other places, that he cannot count them all. The worst was a
suicide bombing that sent him flying down a corridor and left him in a
coma. He was hospitalized for months, and his military career was over.
But his struggles with brain injury were only starting.
“I
have moments when I forget everything: who I am, where I am, what I’m
doing,” he told me. “It happens almost every day,” sometimes while he is
driving. Decisions, once easy, have become impossible. He turns the
kitchen burner on and then walks out, returning to discover a fire
raging.
Matthews
has 24 names tattooed down the center of his back. Eighteen are former
war buddies who were killed in action. The more painful losses, in a
sense, are five others: friends who have killed themselves since
returning from the war. One of them, another Special Operations veteran
with an undiagnosed traumatic brain injury, threatened his wife and
children with a gun six months ago, Matthews told me, then shot himself
in the head. Matthews spoke at the funeral. Undiagnosed blast injuries
are common among the Special Operations soldiers, he said, because
members of this military elite prize their toughness and do not want to
risk losing their careers. “Here’s the harsh reality,” another veteran
told me. “In the Special Forces especially, if I fail my physical, I’m
done. That’s all there is to it. My cool-guy stuff is done.” So they
keep their heads down, say nothing and suffer more blasts. Until one
day, like Brandon Matthews, they are too damaged to fight.
I
met Matthews at a hotel in Scottsdale, Ariz., where he now lives, and
within an hour he had consumed several vodka-and-waters. He was warm and
talkative, but every now and then he got a lost, plaintive look in his
green eyes; I had the impression of a man who is clinging to a
precipice. Before I could turn in, he insisted on steering me to a
series of nightclubs, where he drank round after round and regaled
strangers with his war stories. I asked him about friends, and he told
me that almost all of them were dead. He lives on his military pension,
and at 33, seems to have given up on holding down a job.
All
this is fairly typical of service members and veterans who have
suffered serious or repeated blast injuries, I was told by Susan Ullman,
who runs an outreach network called Warrior2Warrior. (Ullman’s own
husband, a Green Beret who suffered a traumatic brain injury, killed
himself in 2013.) When I asked Matthews about other veterans and
suicide, he grimaced and unleashed a string of obscenities about the
cowardice of taking your own life. It felt cruel, and a little
unnecessary, to ask if he had been tempted that way himself. (He has his
own name tattooed on his back after those of friends who have killed
themselves.)
Even
if the underlying wounds of men like Matthews cannot be treated, the
symptoms of brain injury, like those of trauma, can often be alleviated.
The distinction between organic and emotional injury can be very
blurry; trauma changes neuronal patterns, and therapy can alter a brain
that has been physically damaged. “Everything we know suggests that
people with structural lesion will also respond to pharmacological and
psychological treatment,” said David Brody, a neurologist who has worked
extensively with the military. Finding the right treatment is the key.
Many veterans told me that they had gone to the V.A. and been handed
pills indiscriminately. A number of mostly untested treatments have
gained traction in the past few years, from hyperbaric chambers to
ergonomic mouth guards, and some veterans swear by them.
For
all his mental confusion, Matthews told me that he thinks he can now
distinguish between the emotional wounds he suffered — the survivor’s
guilt, the bad dreams and night terrors — and the more concrete
cognitive problems that he traces to his blast exposure. A number of
Special Operations soldiers said the same thing. They also said it makes
a big difference to be told they have a physical wound rather than a
mental one, even if it is incurable. Some brain injuries can now be seen
on M.R.I.-type brain scans of living people, though precise diagnoses
remain elusive. Matthews told me he would find some solace in simply
being able to see what was going on inside his head.
Daniel Perl is
continuing to examine the brains of blast-injured soldiers. After five
years of working with the military, he feels sure, he told me, that many
blast injuries have not been identified. “We could be talking many
thousands,” he said. “And what scares me is that what we’re seeing now
might just be the first round. If they survive the initial injuries,
many of them may develop C.T.E. years or decades later.”
Perl
takes some solace from the past. He has read a great deal about the men
who suffered from shell shock during World War I and the doctors who
struggled to treat them. He mentioned a monument in central England
called “Shot at Dawn,” dedicated to British and Commonwealth soldiers
who were executed by a firing squad after being convicted of cowardice
or desertion. It is a stone figure of a blindfolded man in a military
storm coat, his hands bound behind him. At his back is a field of thin
stakes, each of them bearing a name, rank, age and date of execution.
Some of these men, Perl believes, probably had traumatic brain injuries
from blasts and should not have been held responsible for their actions.
He has begun looking into the possibility of obtaining brain samples of
shellshocked soldiers from that war. He hopes to examine them under the
microscope, and perhaps, a century later, grant them and their
descendants the diagnoses they deserve.
Robert F. Worth is a
contributing writer for the magazine and the author of “A Rage for
Order,” about the Arab Spring uprisings. He last wrote about Turkey’s hidden war against the Kurds.
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