Declassified documents newly released online:
1. Capabilities and Order of Battle of Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia:
We believe that the Vietnamese forces permanently based in Cambodia, augmented by the existing People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) forces, can accomplish most the security missions that Hanoi envisions for its forces....
...Hanoi intends to maintain a sizeable military presence in Cambodia indefinitely.
2. Cambodia: Vietnamese Strategy and the New Realities (CIA, Oct. 1985):
3. Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime? (CIA, June 1986):
4. Cambodia: Year 10 (Wall Street Journal):
...the real agony of Cambodia began in 1975... Then in 1978 Vietnam invaded, installing a puppet government and taking a large step toward realizing its historical dream of dominating all of Indochina....
Vietnam follows the typical pattern of Soviet clients, accepting some $2 billion a year of Moscow's cash to subsidize its 1.1-million-man army, the world's third largest (after Russia's and China's).
5. Thailand reports Viets mine border with Cambodia (Washington Times, 3 Feb. 1986):
...the Vietnamese apparently forced the civilians from their homes deep in the Cambodian interior and brought them, perhaps on foot, hundreds of miles to the frontier.
"Our intelligence tells us that at least 80,000 Cambodian civilians, maybe more, are constructing bamboo and barbed wire barricades while the Vietnamese troops plant the mines," the military source said. "We're also hearing that many of those civilians are dying of malaria and other diseases."...
The Vietnamese, the Thai source said, appear determined to mine most, if not all, of the Thai-Cambodian border...
6. Hun Sen ‘Unpredictable and Easily Angered,’ CIA Files Say (The Cambodia Daily | 23 January 2017)
U.S. intelligence agents described Prime Minister Hun Sen in 1986 as unpredictable, hotheaded and “wary of strangers,” predicting that Vietnam would maintain a hold on Cambodia once they had pulled troops out of the country, according to declassified files.
The 1986 intelligence assessment, “Cambodia: ‘How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?’” is part of more than 12 million pages of documents the CIA released online on Tuesday, which were previously available only at the U.S. National Archives in Maryland....
“Development of PRK institutions has been slow and erratic,” the assessment says. “The government is still dominated by Vietnamese advisers, the Army remains politically unreliable and tactically inept.”
As a result, the Vietnamese would have to take covert measures in order to conceal its influence after its withdrawal, it says.
“Hanoi appears to recognize that the PRK’s weakness renders its withdrawal timetable unrealistic, and we believe it will have to use subterfuges, such as incorporating Vietnamese troops into Cambodian units, to conceal its presence beyond 1990,” it says.
“In the meantime, we expect Vietnam to promote aggressively an image that the PRK is making rapid progress toward internal self-sufficiency in hopes of eroding international support for the Cambodian resistance”