THE new military dictatorship in Thailand has begun to
set a darker tone, as if to indicate much worse to come. It has
detained members of the political class, shut down the media and put men
in uniforms in charge of government ministries. The borders have been
closed, on an off-and-on basis. At least 155 people, including
politicians and activists, have been banned from leaving the country. On
May 24th, the junta dissolved the senate (the parliament’s upper house)
and assumed total control. For the time being all powers lie with the
National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NPOMC) headed by a
general, Prayuth Chan-ocha. Next up looks likely to be a government
stuffed with more men in green, or people licking their boots.
On
the third day of the new regime the royal palace made public a letter
in which it acknowledged another letter, signed by Mr Prayuth, in which
he had informed the king of the coup. Historically, the palace has
endorsed most coups. Those that did not get the royal nod, including an
April Fool’s Day coup in 1978, failed. It has not yet become clear how
enthusiastic King Bhumibol Aduljadej feels about this one, the twelfth
coup d’état to mark his 64-year reign.
Dozens
of politicians and leaders are detained at army
camps. The most
prominent hostage is Yingluck Shinawatra, till recently the prime
minister and the youngest sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, a former prime
minister who was ousted in the previous coup, in 2006. An army
spokesperson has said that they do not intend to keep Ms Yingluck, who
is being held at a camp outside Bangkok, for more than a week.
Ms
Yingluck and her family have become the junta’s main bargaining chip in
a bold bid to expunge the Shinawatras from politics, once and for all.
The family’s homes have been raided. Mr Thaksin’s son was arrested on
May 24th, held overnight and released the next morning. Mr Thaksin, a
telecoms-tycoon-turned-politician, awoke an electoral giant with
populist policies he introduced in 2001. In three incarnations, his
party has won every election it has been allowed to contest. It was
banned in name, only to be formed again under another. There appeared to
be no real threat to the party’s dominance over the polls, unless it
were to be destroyed by force, or democracy itself were brought down.
Robert Amsterdam, Mr Thaksin’s lawyer, has said that Ms Yingluck and
other leaders are going to establish a government in exile.
The
NPOMC has issued summons for 35 intellectuals and activists, calling on
them to report to the army. The junta has set up a special unit to
monitor social media. It issued a separate summons for Pravit
Rojanaphruk, a prominent journalist and commentator. Mr Pravit, who is
also a harsh critic of Mr Thaksin, wrote a line on Twitter before making
his way to an army base in Bangkok: “On my way to see the new dictator
of #Thailand. Hopefully the last. #freethailand #Thailand #ป #รปห”. The
Thai media have been summoned to report to the army at 2pm on May 25th,
to discuss their post-coup coverage. Some foreign sites have been
blocked too: the BBC, CNN and Human Rights Watch for a start. And junta
has torn up Thailand’s constitution, a document which its predecessor
had written after the most recent coup. The only section still in force
is the one that relates to the monarchy.
In most
respects then it looks like an old-fashioned coup. If that is any
indication, the generals in charge are likely to fail catastrophically.
Both in achieving their own objectives, which are still fuzzy, and in
charting a course for the country to wend its way out of economic
stagnation and social failure. The hope that a democratic majority of
the Thai people will get to choose their own government any time soon
now looks ludicrous.
Civilians find Thailand to be
nearly ungovernable in the best of times. Even then rule of law is more
honoured in the breach. People are even more unlikely to put up with the
new rules, which are woefully lacking in legitimacy. Some have
responded to the orders with derision. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an
academic who is on the army’s summons list, has said that he plans to
send his pet Chihuahua to report to the junta in his stead.
Small
groups of anti-coup demonstrators have been gathering in the capital,
holding up placards that say “Democracy has always been aborted. When
will it be born?” and, less politely, “Fuck the coup”. There
have been protests elsewhere in the country too. At Bangkok’s Victory
Monument, an obelisk dedicated to the victors of the minor Franco-Thai
war of 1941, a rally against the coup ended in ugly scuffles between
protesters and military police. At the monument the protesters were
mainly students, not the Shinawatras’ usual red-shirted supporters. By
Sunday morning, the 25th, troops were seen moving into Bangkok’s central
shopping area, presumably in anticipation of further protests against
their coup. [Taking a page from Hun Xen Kingdoom's democrazy tactics.]
The generals are likely to notice two things
soon. First, that they cannot rule the country unless they are prepared
to use force. Secondly, beyond the walls of the barracks, Thailand has
undergone a dramatic transformation, even since 2006. It has moved away
even further from being the kind of rural agricultural society with its
social relations defined by hierarchical, paternalistic relations. More
each year, it resembles a modern state whose individual citizens and
social groups look out for their own interests. Social changes that took
hundreds of years to emerge in European history have taken just half a
century in Thailand. That is less time than the average age of the
generals who are trying to revive for Thailand a brand of
authoritarianism that was derided as being reserved for the kingdom’s
poor neighbours, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
When
Thailand’s traditional elites made it plain that they did not know how
to run the country in 1997—the year the Asian financial crisis cut short
Thailand’s economic miracle—the public began to seek greater power and
influence for itself. Mr Thaksin happened to be in a position to serve
as their vehicle. A thriving oligarch when he came to power in 2001, he
built a political machine that ran on a simple principle: find out what
people want, and give it to them. He was wily and absolutely ruthless,
and he knew to jump on the train that was already rolling.
This
is the underlying force that the generals have to contend with: not
Thaksin, but the dramatically changed society that stubbornly brought
him to power.
General Prayuth does not look like a
strongman to reorder Thai politics and society. Rather, he looks like a
soldier who got fed up dealing with hopeless politicians, and then
pushed by his arch-royalist superiors into doing their dirty work and
binning electoral democracy.
There are any number of
competing explanations for Thailand’s current conflict and how it came
to the point of yet another military regime. Different analysts point in
turn to the next royal succession, to personal rivalries, major
business deals; corruption, the abuse of power, or to the emergence of
“urban villagers” as an electoral base.
Every one of
these explanations leaves us with the same stark question about the
immediate future. Are the historical elites going to continue to be in
charge of the country? This leads to another question, about the Thai
army. Ask not whether it will quit ousting governments and installing
their replacements, but how: cruelly, unleashing the sort of horrors
that would set the country back many more years; or by compromise and
deal-making?
(Picture credit: AFP)
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