Q&A: South China Sea Tensions and the Future of Asean        

Wall Street Journal | 22 May 2014

This picture, taken from a Vietnam Coast Guard ship on May 14, shows a Vietnamese Coast Guard ship (left) being challenged by a Chinese Coast Guard ship near to the site of a Chinese oil rig that has set off a tense dispute between the two countries.

Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

A simmering dispute between China and some of its Southeast Asian neighbors over the South China Sea flared up last week – sparking deadly riots and protests in Vietnam. 

China’s increasingly aggressive moves to press its claims to parts of the waters, believed to be rich in oil, has drawn out deep-seated grievances  in Vietnam and posed challenges to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a body formed nearly 50 years ago to ensure peace in the region.

Southeast Asia Real Time asked several experts their thoughts on the current tensions and what they mean for the future security of Southeast Asia. Here are their responses.

Ian Storey, senior fellow specializing in Asian security issues at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. 

WSJ: Is there ever a chance that Asean could adopt the role of a security alliance? And if not, is it time to create a separate grouping that could serve this role?

Mr. Storey: Absolutely not. Asean has eschewed the role of a military alliance since its foundation in 1967. At the time, the five members were all pro-Western and anti-Communist and yet they still rejected the role of a military alliance – now the membership is much more diverse and member states do not perceive a common threat. In general, the prospect of an “Asian NATO” is pretty much close to zero. Why form a military alliance against your largest trade partner?

WSJ: Is Asean maxed out? It wasn’t founded to deal with the kinds of disputes we’ve seen it face in recent years, so has it reached it reached the full extent of its usefulness?

Mr. Storey: No, Asean is not maxed out. It’s still extremely important for the member states, as well as external powers who continue to court it. Asean cannot resolve the South China Sea dispute – only the claimants can do that among themselves, or by submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Asean’s role in the SCS dispute is to promote a conflict management process which aims at reducing tensions and building trust. But after 20 years, the results are mixed, to say the least.

WSJ: How big a challenge to Asean’s legitimacy are the disputes we’re seeing now? What role do countries not involved, such as Indonesia, have to play in calming tensions?

Mr. Storey: To some extent the SCS dispute does put Asean’s credibility on the line. Part of the blame lies with China because of its assertive behavior, and part of the blame lies with Asean itself because of the lack of a strong consensus within the organization on how to deal with China and identify pathways to a resolution.

Carl Thayer, professor humanities and social sciences and an expert on Vietnamese foreign policy in the Australian Defense Force Academy at the University of New South Wales. 

WSJ: Can the Vietnamese government stand up for itself enough to calm the anger and protests within the country without forcing China to act even more provocatively?

Mr. Thayer: Yes the Vietnam government has extensive resources to repress any further protests, violent or otherwise, that take place. The Vietnamese government has also moved to assuage China by clamping down and arresting workers involved in the violent attacks on Chinese and other foreign invested properties. But the Vietnamese government will have its work cut out calming nationalist anti-China sentiment. Many of those who protested peacefully in the cities are critical by what they perceive as government inaction.

WSJ: Vietnam obviously can’t stand up militarily to China but also doesn’t seem to have much support from its Asean neighbors. What would it need to do to strike an alliance with the U.S. similar to what the Philippines has? And is this something it desires?

Mr. Thayer: Vietnam will not strike an alliance with the United States under any circumstances. Vietnam is fearful that in the end China and the U.S. will reach agreement over the South China Sea at Vietnam’s expense. Vietnam has a policy of three no’s enshrined in the last two Defense White Papers: no foreign military bases, no military alliances, and no use of a third country against another country. U.S.-Vietnam defense and security relations are very low level.

WSJ: How serious is the current standoff – worse than the border war in 1979? And what might it portend for the future?

Mr. Thayer: The current crisis is the worst eruption in bilateral relations since the 1979 border war, but it hardly bears comparison. In 1977 and 1978, prior to the border war, there were rising deadly incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border. A quarter of a million ethnic Chinese (or Hoa people) fled into southern China. After the border war, the border was tense, featuring frequent Chinese artillery barrages during Vietnam’s decade-long intervention in Cambodia.

An escalation of violence is always a possibility given the daily confrontation at sea around the oil rig. China will bluster and get its pound of flesh for the violence directed at Chinese factories and workers. China will keep up the pressure long enough to convince Vietnam to adopt a conciliatory and accommodationist posture. When China put the rig in Vietnam’s waters it claimed it would operate from May 2 to August 15. China kept the door open for it to de-escalate on its terms. At some point China will receive a Vietnamese high-level envoy and they will reach terms to manage this situation. Both sides will put a spin on their agreement as part of a face-saving arrangement.

Murray Hiebert, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

WSJ: How do Asean’s members relate to China?

Mr. Hiebert: For many countries in Southeast Asia, China is their biggest aid donor, biggest investor, and most important trading partner. Vietnam, for example, gets much of its electricity for the northern part of the country and many of the inputs for its booming garment exports from China.  Thailand is Asean’s interlocutor with China.

WSJ: What came out of the recent biannual Asean summit in Myanmar?

Mr. Hiebert: Vietnam clearly wanted Asean leaders to make a strong statement condemning China’s positioning of an oil exploration rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone as violating its sovereignty. In the end, ASEAN officials expressed concern about the tensions and called for peaceful resolution of the dispute. In hindsight, not much more could have been expected. Asean countries have very different views about China. Four countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam) are disputants with China in the South China Sea and for countries like Cambodia and Laos, China is the largest aid donor,” said Mr. Heibert, noting that Singapore and Thailand are “cautious” about irritating China.  “Considering these very different perspectives on the role of China in the region, expressions of concern would likely have been all that all 10 Asean countries could have agreed on.