Q&A: The Case of Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal
Human Rights Watch | 31 August 2015
On July 20, 2015,
the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, will stand trial on charges
of crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes before the Extraordinary African Chambers
in the Senegal court system. The chambers were inaugurated by Senegal
and the African Union in February 2013 to prosecute the “person or
persons” most responsible for international crimes committed in Chad
between 1982 and 1990, the period when Habré ruled Chad. After two days,
the trial was adjourned when Habré’s lawyers refused to appear and the
court appointed three lawyers to represent him and gave them 45 days to
prepare the case. The trial will resume on September 7.
Habré’s trial is the first in the world in which the courts of one
country prosecute the former ruler of another for alleged human rights
crimes. It is also the first universal jurisdiction case to proceed to
trial in Africa. Universal jurisdiction is a concept under international
law that allows national courts to prosecute the most serious crimes
even when committed abroad, by a foreigner and against foreign victims.
The New York Times has called the case “a Milestone for Justice in Africa.”
The following questions and answers provide more information on the case and what lies ahead.
- Who is Hissène Habré?
- What are the charges against Habré?
- What crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the court?
- Why has it taken so long to bring Habré to justice?
- What has been the role of the Chadian government in bringing about Habré’s prosecution?
- How did the chambers carry out their investigation?
- What did the court-appointed experts find?
- Why is Hissène Habré the only person standing trial?
- What about Déby, Chad’s current president?
- What are the accused’s rights?
- Habré is refusing to cooperate with the chambers. What effect will that have?
- Habré says he will not appear in court. What will happen?
- The Court has appointed counsel to represent Habré against his wishes. Was this proper? What will happen if Habré objects to the lawyers?
- What is the maximum punishment Habré could receive?
- How are the Extraordinary Chambers structured and administered?
- How are the prosecutors and judges assigned?
- How will the trial be conducted?
- How long will the trial last?
- Will victims have a role in the trial, and will they receive reparations?
- How will people in Chad know about the trial?
- What about the trial in Chad of Habré-era security agents?
- How are the chambers funded?
- What were the key steps in the campaign to bring Habré to justice?
- What is the significance of Habré’s prosecution under universal jurisdiction?
- How does this trial fit into critiques of the role of international justice in Africa and claims that universal jurisdiction cases target Africans?
- Why was it necessary to create special chambers with an international element?
- Why isn’t Habré prosecuted in Chad?
- Why can’t the International Criminal Court prosecute Habre?
Habré was president of the former French colony of Chad from 1982
until he was deposed in 1990 by Idriss Déby Itno, the current president.
Habré has been living in exile in Senegal ever since.
A 714-page study by Human Rights Watch
found that Habré’s government was responsible for widespread political
killings, systematic torture, and thousands of arbitrary arrests. The
government periodically targeted civil populations, including in the
south (1983-1985), and various ethnic groups such as Chadian Arabs, the
Hadjerai (1987) and the Zaghawa (1989-90), killing and arresting group
members en masse when it was perceived that their leaders posed a threat to Habré’s rule.
A 1992 Chadian Truth Commission accused Habré's government of 40,000
political murders and systematic torture. Most abuses were carried out
by his dreaded political police,
the Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS), whose directors
reported directly to Habré. The directors all belonged to Habré’s inner
circle, and some belonged to the same ethnic group, Gorane anakaza, or
even the same family as Habré.
Habré was indicted for crimes against humanity, torture and war
crimes by the chambers’ four investigating judges on July 2, 2013. On
February 13, 2015, after a 19-month investigation, the judges found
sufficient evidence for Habré to face charges of crimes against humanity
and torture as a member of a “joint criminal enterprise” and of war crimes on the basis of his superior responsibility. Specifically, they charged Habré with:
- The massive practice of murder, summary executions, kidnapping followed by enforced disappearance and torture, amounting to crimes against humanity, against the Hadjerai and Zaghawa ethnic groups, the people of southern Chad and political opponents;
- Torture; and
- The war crimes of murder, torture, unlawful transfer and unlawful confinement, and violence to life and physical well-being.
The chamber’s statute
gives it competence over the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and torture as defined in the statute. The
definitions generally track those used in the statutes of the
International Criminal Court and other international tribunals. The
crimes must have taken place in Chad between June 7, 1982, and December
1, 1990, which corresponds to the dates of Habré’s rule.
The advent of the trial, almost 25 years after Habré’s fall, is
entirely due to the perseverance of Habré’s victims and their allies in
nongovernmental groups. When Habré was arrested in July 2013, the Toronto Globe and Mail lauded “one of the world’s most patient and tenacious campaigns for justice.” The New York Times wrote that the “case has proved unusual for the tenacity of his victims, and of Human Rights Watch, in seeking to bring him to justice.”
Habré was first indicted by a Senegalese judge in 2000, but for the
next 12 years the Senegalese government of former President Abdoulaye
Wade subjected the victims to what the Nobel Peace Prize winner
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 117 groups from 25 African countries
described as an “interminable political and legal soap opera.” It was only in 2012, when Macky Sall became president of Senegal and the International Court of Justice ordered Senegal to prosecute or extradite Habré that progress was made toward the trial.
Habré’s lawyers claim that Deby’s government is behind the effort to
prosecute him. However, since the victims’ first complaint in 2000, it
has been the victims and their supporters who have pressed the case
forward, overcoming one obstacle after another. The Chadian government
has long expressed its support for Habré’s prosecution, and in 2002 it waived Habré's immunity from prosecution abroad,
but it did not otherwise contribute to advancing the case in a
meaningful way until it agreed to help finance the court and cooperated
with the investigating judges during their four missions to Chad. More
recently, the Chadian government has seemingly cooled toward the
chambers, particularly in its refusal to transfer additional suspects.
The investigating judges began with access to a considerable amount
of evidence collected in the years since Habré’s fall, including prior
Belgian and Chadian investigations into Habré’s alleged crimes.
A 1992 National Truth Commission in Chad accused Habré’s government
of systemic torture and an estimated 40,000 political assassinations,
and documented the methods used to carry out torture. One of the first
witnesses the chambers’ investigating judges interviewed was the former
Truth Commission president, a leading Chadian lawyer. In addition, the
chambers’ judges obtained the extensive file Belgian investigators
prepared on Habré during four years, which contains interviews with
witnesses and “insiders” who worked alongside Habré, as well as DDS
documents.
Most important, the chambers’ four investigating judges conducted
their own thorough 19-month investigation, and for the most part relied
on evidence they developed themselves.
On May 3, 2013, Senegal and Chad signed a “Judicial cooperation agreement” to facilitate the chambers’ investigation in Chad.
The investigative judges conducted four missions (“commissions rogatoires”)
to Chad - in August - September 2013, December 2013, March 2014, and
May - June 2014. They were accompanied by the chief prosecutor and his
deputies as well as police officers. During their visits, the judges
gathered statements from 2,500 direct and indirect victims and key
witnesses, including former officials of the Habré government. Although
the Judicial cooperation agreement allowed the Senegalese investigative
judges to interview people with Chadian authorities not present, the
judges chose not to.
The judges took copies of DDS files that Human Rights Watch had uncovered
in 2001. Among the tens of thousands of documents were daily lists of
prisoners and deaths in detention, interrogation reports, surveillance
reports, and death certificates. The files detail how Habré placed the
DDS under his direct control and kept tight control over DDS
operations. Analysis of the data
for Human Rights Watch revealed the names of 1,208 people who were
killed or died in detention and 12,321 victims of human rights
violations. In these files alone, Habré received 1,265 direct
communications from the DDS about the status of 898 detainees.
The judges also appointed experts on data analysis, forensic
anthropology, handwriting, the historical context of Habré’s government
and the functioning and command structure of Habré’s military.
Patrick Ball of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group conducted a study of mortality in Habré’s prisons. His conclusion was that, for the period he studied, prison mortality was “hundreds of times higher than normal mortality for adult men in Chad during the same period” and “substantially higher than some of the twentieth century’s worst POW contexts” such as German prisoners of war in Soviet custody and US prisoners of war in Japanese custody.
Experts from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team carried out exhumations at a number of potential mass grave sites. In Deli,
in southern Chad, for instance, the site of an alleged killing of
unarmed rebels in September 1984, the experts located 21 bodies, almost
all military-age men, most of whom were killed by gunshot. In Mongo, in the center of Chad, the experts uncovered 14 bodies from another 1984 massacre.
A handwriting expert appointed by the judges looked at documents allegedly written or signed by Habré. He confirmed,
for instance, that it was Habré who responded to a request by the
International Committee of the Red Cross for the hospitalization of
certain prisoners of war by writing “From now on, no prisoner of war can leave the Detention Center except in case of death.”
The Chadian victims’ goal in seeking justice in Senegal since 2000
has been a trial of Habré, the head of state who directly controlled the
security apparatus and had primary responsibility for his government’s
actions. The victims also filed cases in 2000 in Chad against other
officials of Habré’s government who were still in Chad.
Under article 3 of the chambers’ statute, the Extraordinary African
Chambers can prosecute “the person or persons most responsible” for
international crimes committed in Chad during Habré’s rule. In July
2013, the chief prosecutor requested the indictment of five additional
officials from Habré’s administration suspected of being responsible for
international crimes. These are:
- Saleh Younous and Guihini Korei, two former directors of the DDS, Habré’s political police. Korei is Habré’s nephew;
- Abakar Torbo, former director of the DDS prison service;
- Mahamat Djibrine, also known as “El Djonto,” one of the “most feared torturers in Chad,” according to the National Truth Commission; and
- Zakaria Berdei, former special security adviser to the presidency and one of those suspected of responsibility in the repression in the south in 1984.
None of them have been brought before the court, however.
Younous and Djibrine were convicted in Chad on charges stemming from the
complaints filed by victims in the Chadian courts, and Chad has refused
to extradite them to Senegal. Berdei is also believed to be in Chad,
though he is not in custody. The location of Torbo and Korei is unknown,
and they have not been arrested under the chambers’ indictments. As a
result, only Habré was committed to trial.
President Déby was commander in chief of Habré’s forces during the
period known as “Black September,” in 1984, when a murderous wave of
repression was unleashed to bring southern Chad back into the fold of
the central government. In 1985, Déby was removed from this post, and
after a period of study in a military school in France, was appointed a
defense adviser until he left Chad in 1989.
It is important to note that Article 10 of the chambers’ statute provides that “[t]he
official position of an accused, whether as Head of State or
Government, or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve
him or her of criminal responsibility….” The chambers were thus
free to pursue charges against President Déby even though he is
currently a head of state, but they did not.
Habré is entitled to the right to a fair trial in accordance with
international law. He is represented by legal counsel of his own
choosing. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights outline the minimum guarantees that must be afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings.
In accordance with those standards, the chambers’ Statute provides a number of rights to defendants, including:
- the right to be present during trial;
- the presumption of innocence;
- the right to a public hearing;
- the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense;
- the right to counsel and legal assistance;
- the right to be tried without undue delay; and
- the right to examine and call witnesses.
Many defendants facing trial before tribunals for alleged crimes
under international criminal law – such as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan
Karadžić and Charles Taylor– asserted that they did not recognize the
authority of the tribunal or that they would not cooperate, or have
sought to use the trial as a platform to present their version of
events.
The burden always remains on the prosecution to prove Habré’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if an accused decides to not
cooperate in his own trial, he inevitably undermines the exercise of his
right to an effective defense, which includes the ability to challenge
the evidence against him and his opportunity to call into question the
prosecution’s case.
The judges of the chambers have the responsibility to ensure that the
trial against Habre proceeds in accordance with his rights to a fair
hearing, but also that justice is dispensed expeditiously and without
manipulations, including by the accused.
Under Senegalese procedural law, which is applied by the Chambers, if
Habré refuses to appear willingly, the court president has the choice
of either going forward with the trial in his absence or of ordering
that he be brought to court by force. At his preliminary hearing on June
3, and at the trial itself Habré’s presence was ordered by the court.
13. The Court has appointed counsel to represent Habré
against his wishes. Was this proper? What will happen if Habré objects
to the lawyers?
Under Senegalese law, the presence of defense counsel at trial is
necessary. When Habré’s lawyers refused to appear, the Chambers
appointed counsel to act on his behalf to ensure a fair trial.
Both national courts and international criminal tribunals have
appointed counsel against the will of defendants to represent the
interests of the defense during trial. In the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the defendant
refused to give instructions to the appointed defense lawyers, claiming
that the tribunal was politically biased. The ICTR refused the
appointed counsel’s request to withdraw, stating that “Counsel are under an obligation to mount an active defence in the best interest of the Accused,” and that the lawyers also “represents
the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the Accused receives a fair
trial. The aim is to obtain efficient representation and adversarial
proceedings.” The Special Court for Sierra Leone refused a similar request by Augustine Gbao to have his appointed counsel dismissed because he considered the court illegitimate, noting that “the
interest of justice would not be served by allowing Mr. Gbao to be
unrepresented before this Court. ... [The court] must safeguard the
rights of the accused and the integrity of the proceedings.”
It is possible that Habré may seek to recuse his court-appointed
lawyers but under Senegalese law only the presiding judge can remove a
court-appointed lawyer. Appointed lawyers risk disciplinary sanctions
under Senegalese law if they refuse to cooperate.
If Habré is found guilty, the chambers could impose a sentence of up
to life in prison, depending on the circumstances and the gravity of the
crime(s). They could also order him to pay a fine or forfeit any of the
proceeds, property or assets derived directly or indirectly from the
crime(s).
The Extraordinary African Chambers have been created inside the
existing Senegalese court structure in Dakar, namely the Dakar District
Court and the Appeals Court in Dakar. The chambers have four levels: an
Investigative Chamber with four Senegalese investigative judges, an
Indicting Chamber of three Senegalese judges, a Trial Chamber, and an
Appeals Chamber. The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber each have two
Senegalese judges and a president from another African Union member
state.
The chief prosecutor is Mbacké Fall. The chambers have an administrator – Aly Ciré Ba
– to ensure the smooth functioning of their activities and to handle
all non-judicial aspects of the work. The administrator’s
responsibilities include financial management of personnel, outreach and
media information, witness protection and assistance, and judicial
cooperation between Senegal and other countries, such as Chad.
The prosecutors and investigative judges were nominated by Senegal’s
justice minister and appointed by the chairperson of the AU Commission.
The President of the Trial Chamber is Gberdao Gustave Kam of Burkina Faso.
The trial will be conducted in accordance with the Senegalese Code of
Criminal Procedure, which essentially follows the French civil law
“inquisitorial” model rather than the “adversarial” model used in
Anglo-Saxon common-law systems. The presiding judge assumes a direct
role, examining the accused and witnesses. The prosecutor and the
lawyers for the defendants and the victims may also have questions put
to the accused and witnesses. There are no strict rules of evidence as
in common-law systems. The lawyers’ final summations, or plaidoiries, assume a particular importance in this model.
A provisional calendar envisages that the first stage of the trial,
to determine Habre’s guilt, will last approximately two months, until
October 30. If Habré is found guilty, there would be a second stage to
look at the question of civil parties and reparations. The Chambers’
budget provides for transportation from Chad of 100 witnesses.
Victims are permitted to participate in proceedings as civil parties,
represented by legal counsel. More than 4,000 victims have registered
as civil parties.
Senegalese procedural law governs participation by the victims. The
victims’ lawyers participated in pre-trial proceedings, as when victims’
accounts were contrasted with Habré’s. At trial, the victims’ lawyers
will be able to have questions put to witnesses or the accused, and to
seek reparations. It is unlikely, however, that more than a small
number of victims will testify during the trial.
Under its statute
in the event of a conviction, the chambers may order reparations
against the accused to be paid into a victims’ fund, which can also
receive voluntary contributions by foreign governments, international
institutions, and non-governmental organizations. Reparations from the
victims’ fund will be open to all victims, individually or
collectively, whether or not they participated in Habré’s trial. The
chambers have not yet created such a fund, however.
Chad’s truth commission accused Habré of emptying out the national
treasury in the days before his flight to Senegal, and it is widely
believed that he has millions of dollars. The chambers have frozen two
small bank accounts belonging to him and a property in an upscale Dakar
neighborhood.
In July 2013, after the chambers arrested Habré, President Déby said
that the Chadian government would compensate survivors and relatives of
those who died. Chad’s responsibility under international law to
provide reparations to victims of gross human rights violations is
separate and distinct from reparations against the accused.
The chambers’ Statute
provides for filming and recording trial proceedings for broadcasting
purposes, as with other internationalized trials, and for public access
to the trial by journalists and non-governmental organizations. The
Judicial Cooperation Agreement commits Chad to broadcast the recordings
of proceedings on public radio and television and to allow private media
entities to do the same. The justice ministers of both countries agreed in November 2013 that the trial would be broadcast.
The first two days of the trial were recorded and streamed, broadcast in Chad and are available on the Chambers’ web-site.
Human Rights Watch believes that filming the entire trial is critical
for the historical record. In addition, subject to appropriate measures
that may be necessary to ensure security of witnesses, retransmission
of the trial, to Chad in particular, as well as the preparation of
abstracts of the trial and video summaries, serves the key purposes of
ensuring that the trial is meaningful to, and understood by, the people
of Chad and helps to build the rule of law in both Chad and Senegal. The
landmark nature of this trial makes it all the more important to make
it available for viewing by the widest possible audience. This means
that the footage and sound should be freely available, to media,
filmmakers and the public.
The chambers, through a consortium of non-governmental organizations
from Senegal, Belgium and Chad who received a contract from the court,
have undertaken outreach programs to both Chad and Senegal. The
consortium has trained journalists in both countries, organized public
debates, created a website and produced materials to explain the trial.
Chad and Senegal have also agreed to cooperate to facilitate both the
travel of Chadian journalists to Senegal and the travel to Chad for all
those involved in the trial proceedings.
On March 25, 2015, a Chadian criminal court convicted 20 Habré-era security agents
on charges of murder, torture, kidnapping and arbitrary detention,
based on complaints filed by the victims in 2000 but that were stalled
until the Senegal created the chambers. The court sentenced seven men to
life in prison including Younous, a former director of the DDS, and Djibrine,
described as one of the “most feared torturers in Chad” by the Truth
Commission. Both men were also wanted by the chambers, but Chad declined to transfer them.
Most of the 20 gave their testimony to the chambers when they visited
Chad, and it is likely that the chambers will seek to have them come to
Dakar for the trial. The Chadian court acquitted four others and
ordered that the Chadian government and the convicted persons each pay
half of US$125 million in reparations to over 7,000 victims. The court
also ordered that the government within a year erect a monument to those
who were killed under Habré and that the former DDS headquarters be
turned into a museum. These were both among the long-standing demands of
the victims’ associations. During the Chad trial, about 50 victims described their torture and mistreatment at the hands of DDS agents.
The chambers are funded in large part by donor countries. In November
2012, Senegal and a number of donor countries agreed to a budget of
€8.6million (US$11.4 million at the time) to cover Habré’s trial.
Commitments were made by: Chad (2 billion CFA francs or US$3,743,000),
the European Union (€2 million), the Netherlands (€1 million), the
African Union (US$1 million), the United States (US$1 million), Belgium
(€500,000), Germany (€500,000), France (€300,000), and Luxembourg
(€100,000). In addition, Canada, Switzerland, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross have provided technical assistance. A
Steering Committee consisting of Senegal and the donor countries and
institutions receives and approves periodic reports from the
administrator.
In January 2000, a group of Chadian victims filed a complaint against Habré in Senegal. In February of the same year, a Senegalese judge indicted Habré
on charges of torture, crimes against humanity, and “barbaric acts”.
However, after political interference by the new Senegalese government
of President Abdoulaye Wade, which was denounced by two UN human rights rapporteurs, appellate courts dismissed the case on the ground that Senegalese courts lacked jurisdiction to try crimes committed abroad.
Other Habré victims, including three Belgian citizens of Chadian origin, then filed a case against him in Belgium in November 2000. The Belgian authorities investigated the case for four years, then indicted Habré in 2005 and sought his extradition. A Senegalese court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the extradition request.
Senegal then turned to the African Union (AU), which in July 2006 called on Senegal to prosecute Habré “on behalf of Africa”
before its own national judicial system. President Wade accepted the AU
mandate and Senegalese law was amended to give the country’s courts
explicit universal jurisdiction over international crimes, including
torture and crimes against humanity. However, Wade contended that
Senegal needed full up-front international funding of €27.4 million
(US$36.5 million) before beginning any prosecution. Three years of
halting negotiations over the trial budget ensued, until Senegal and
donor countries finally agreed in November 2010 to a budget of €8.6 million (US$11.4 million) for Habré’s trial.
Just days before the budget agreement, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ruled that Habré should be tried before a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.” In January 2011, the AU responded to the ECOWAS court ruling by proposing a plan for special chambers within the Senegalese justice system with some judges appointed by the AU. Senegal rejected the plan, and in May 2011, withdrew from negotiations with the AU over creation of the tribunal.
In July 2011, Senegal’s foreign minister ruled out holding Habré's trial in Senegal. The Chadian government then announced its support for extraditing Habré to Belgium to face trial.
In 2011 and 2012, Belgium issued three more extradition requests,
which were not properly transmitted to the courts by the Senegalese
authorities.
On July 20, 2012, in response to a suit brought by Belgium, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s highest judicial organ, found that Senegal had failed to meet its obligations under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and ordered Senegal to prosecute Habré “without further delay” if it did not extradite him.
The new Senegalese government of Macky Sall reacted
quickly to the ICJ decision, expressing regret that Habré’s trial had
not taken place sooner and reaffirming its commitment to begin
proceedings quickly. Negotiations resumed between Senegal and the AU,
which ultimately led to an agreement to create the Extraordinary African Chambers to conduct proceedings within the Senegalese judicial system. On December 17, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a law establishing the special chambers. On February 8, 2013, the Extraordinary African Chambers were inaugurated in Dakar.
As demonstrated by the Habré case, universal jurisdiction is an
important safety net to ensure that suspects of atrocities do not enjoy
impunity in a third state when they cannot be prosecuted before the
courts of the country where the crimes were allegedly committed or
before an international court. There has been an increase in the use of
universal jurisdiction over the past 20 years, notably but not
exclusively by courts in European countries. To strengthen the fight
against impunity for the most serious crimes, it is critical for courts
on all continents to use universal jurisdiction. The African Union has
encouraged its member states to adopt legislation to give their national
courts universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide and has taken steps to initiate a network of national
prosecutors working on war crimes cases. Several investigations have
been open in South Africa and Senegal on the basis of universal
jurisdiction.
25. How does this trial fit into critiques of the role of
international justice in Africa and claims that universal jurisdiction
cases target Africans?
Habré’s trial is an important step forward in African states taking
responsibility to prosecute serious international crimes. However, the
Habré trial does not negate the importance of the ICC and the use of
universal jurisdiction by non-African states, including European courts,
for crimes committed in Africa. These tools are often the only
available hope for justice for African victims.
It is a reality that international justice has been applied unevenly.
Powerful countries and their allies have often been able to avoid
justice when serious crimes are committed on their territories, notably
by failing to ratify the ICC treaty and wielding their political
influence at the UN Security Council.
Nongovernmental organizations have actively campaigned
for African governments to work to improve international justice and
its reach —as opposed to undermining it— to limit impunity for
atrocities.
Habré’s complaint with the ECOWAS Court of Justice in October 2008,
contended that his trial in Senegal, on the basis of Senegal’s 2007-08
legislative changes, would violate the prohibition against retroactive
application of criminal law.
On November 18, 2010, the ECOWAS court ruled that to avoid violating the principle of non-retroactivity, Habré would have to be tried before a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.” International law experts have questioned
the ECOWAS court decision because the prosecution of acts that, at the
time of their commission, were already prohibited by international
conventions and customary law does not violate the principle of
non-retroactivity. In this case, examples include torture, war crimes
and crimes against humanity. In its 2012 decision, the ICJ made clear
that Senegal was under an obligation to investigate and prosecute
torture allegations against Habré since it had ratified the UN
Convention on Torture in 1987.
Nonetheless, Senegal complied with the ECOWAS court ruling by creating the Extraordinary African Chambers, a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.”
In April 2013, Habré’s lawyers filed a new application with the
ECOWAS court seeking the suspension of the chambers’ activities. In a
November 5, 2013 decision,
the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the
application because the chambers were established under a treaty between
Senegal and the African Union.
Chad never sought Habré’s extradition, and there are serious doubts
that Habré could get a fair trial in Chad, where he has already been
sentenced to death in absentia for his alleged role in a 2008
rebellion. In July 2011, President Wade threatened to expel Habré to
Chad but, days later, retracted his decision in the face of an
international outcry over the risk that Habré would be mistreated or
even killed.
The International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction over crimes
committed after July 1, 2002, when its statute entered into effect. The
crimes of which Hissène Habré is accused took place between 1982 and
1990.
There is No Surprise that the Yuon's slave Ah Kwack is facilitating the Vietnamization of Cambodia by implementing tough measures to shut Khmer 's mouths.
ReplyDeleteFor some unknown reasons, the idiots KI's administrators have been paving the way for Ah Kwack to also shut Khmer's mouths quite a while ago.
I am wondering how much these KI's administrators sold their Airheads to Ah Kwack, Ah Kwen, and the evil Yuon ?????
It's was to long for this guy but Hun sen case will be longer than that or never step in the court at all. Here's why? He is still in power and no one can touch him especially YUON will protect him and I never see International court arrest the bad leader that still have power and put in jail at all. I see a lot of people hope that ICC will bring HUN SEN to court soon but I think just hope and It will not happen. It like this guy has no power for 25years and just bring to court. 25 years for Hun Sen from now than he will be with Sihanouk.
ReplyDeleteThe dumb Asses KI's administrators have abused Heng Soy's principals when they required commentators' IDs.
ReplyDeleteMoney can buy anything even KI's administrators heads.
When will those assholes at KI and Khmerization wake up and realize that their stupid deeds would only help Ah Yuon and Ah Sen??
ReplyDeleteGood job!
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gT47xSoKv9M