Artificial intelligence
March of the machines
What history tells us about the future of artificial intelligence—and how society should respond
EXPERTS warn that “the substitution of machinery for human labour”
may “render the population redundant”. They worry that “the discovery of
this mighty power” has come “before we knew how to employ it rightly”.
Such fears are expressed today by those who worry that advances in
artificial intelligence (AI) could destroy millions of jobs and pose a
“Terminator”-style threat to humanity. But these are in fact the words
of commentators discussing mechanisation and steam power two centuries
ago. Back then the controversy over the dangers posed by machines was
known as the “machinery question”. Now a very similar debate is under
way.
After many false dawns, AI has made extraordinary progress in the
past few years, thanks to a versatile technique called “deep learning”.
Given enough data, large (or “deep”) neural networks, modelled on the
brain’s architecture, can be trained to do all kinds of things. They
power Google’s search engine, Facebook’s automatic photo tagging,
Apple’s voice assistant, Amazon’s shopping recommendations and Tesla’s
self-driving cars. But this rapid progress has also led to concerns
about safety and job losses. Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and others
wonder whether AI could get out of control, precipitating a sci-fi
conflict between people and machines. Others worry that AI will cause
widespread unemployment, by automating cognitive tasks that could
previously be done only by people. After 200 years, the machinery
question is back. It needs to be answered.
Machinery questions and answers
The most alarming scenario is of rogue AI turning evil, as seen in
countless sci-fi films. It is the modern expression of an old fear,
going back to “Frankenstein” (1818) and beyond. But although AI systems
are impressive, they can perform only very specific tasks: a general AI
capable of outwitting its human creators remains a distant and uncertain
prospect. Worrying about it is like worrying about overpopulation on
Mars before colonists have even set foot there, says Andrew Ng, an AI
researcher. The more pressing aspect of the machinery question is what
impact AI might have on people’s jobs and way of life.
Each time, in fact, technology ultimately created more jobs than it
destroyed, as the automation of one chore increased demand for people to
do the related tasks that were still beyond machines. Replacing some
bank tellers with ATMs, for example, made it cheaper to open new
branches, creating many more new jobs in sales and customer service.
Similarly, e-commerce has increased overall employment in retailing. As
with the introduction of computing into offices, AI will not so much
replace workers directly as require them to gain new skills to
complement it (see our special report
in this issue). Although a much-cited paper suggests that up to 47% of
American jobs face potential automation in the next decade or two, other
studies estimate that less than 10% will actually go.
Even if job losses in the short term are likely to be more than
offset by the creation of new jobs in the long term, the experience of
the 19th century shows that the transition can be traumatic. Economic
growth took off after centuries of stagnant living standards, but
decades passed before this was fully reflected in higher wages. The
rapid shift of growing populations from farms to urban factories
contributed to unrest across Europe. Governments took a century to
respond with new education and welfare systems.
This time the transition is likely to be faster, as technologies
diffuse more quickly than they did 200 years ago. Income inequality is
already growing, because high-skill workers benefit disproportionately
when technology complements their jobs. This poses two challenges for
employers and policymakers: how to help existing workers acquire new
skills; and how to prepare future generations for a workplace stuffed
full of AI.
An intelligent response
As technology changes the skills needed for each profession, workers
will have to adjust. That will mean making education and training
flexible enough to teach new skills quickly and efficiently. It will
require a greater emphasis on lifelong learning and on-the-job training,
and wider use of online learning and video-game-style simulation. AI
may itself help, by personalising computer-based learning and by
identifying workers’ skills gaps and opportunities for retraining.
Social and character skills will matter more, too. When jobs are
perishable, technologies come and go and people’s working lives are
longer, social skills are a foundation. They can give humans an edge,
helping them do work that calls for empathy and human interaction—traits
that are beyond machines.
And welfare systems will have to be updated, to smooth the
transitions between jobs and to support workers while they pick up new
skills. One scheme widely touted as a panacea is a “basic income”, paid
to everybody regardless of their situation. But that would not make
sense without strong evidence that this technological revolution, unlike
previous ones, is eroding the demand for labour. Instead countries
should learn from Denmark’s “flexicurity” system, which lets firms hire
and fire easily, while supporting unemployed workers as they retrain and
look for new jobs. Benefits, pensions and health care should follow
individual workers, rather than being tied (as often today) to
employers.
Despite the march of technology, there is little sign that
industrial-era education and welfare systems are yet being modernised
and made flexible. Policymakers need to get going now because, the
longer they delay, the greater the burden on the welfare state. John
Stuart Mill wrote in the 1840s that “there cannot be a more legitimate
object of the legislator’s care” than looking after those whose
livelihoods are disrupted by technology. That was true in the era of the
steam engine, and it remains true in the era of artificial
intelligence.
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