What is the impossible trinity?
This week “The Economist explains” is given over to economics.
Today’s is the last in a series of six explainers on a seminal idea.
IN THE run-up to the launch of the euro, in 1999, aspiring members pegged their currencies to the German mark. As a consequence they were obliged to shadow the Bundesbank’s monetary policy. For some countries, this monetary serfdom was tolerable because their industries were closely tied to Germany’s, and business conditions rose and fell in tandem. But some countries could not live with it. Britain had been forced to abandon its currency peg with Germany, in 1992, because it was in recession even as Germany enjoyed a boom. In the present day, China faces a related conundrum. It would like to open itself fully to capital flows in order to create a modern financial system, in which market forces play a bigger role. Last summer it took some small steps towards that end. But doing so at a time of sluggish economic growth raised fears that the yuan would dive. As markets panicked, China’s capital controls were swiftly tightened.
Both predicaments were a consequence of the macroeconomic policy
trilemma, also called the impossible trinity. It says a country must choose
between free capital mobility, exchange-rate management and an independent
monetary policy. Only two of the three are possible. A country that wishes to
fix the value of its currency and also have an interest-rate policy that is
free from outside influence cannot allow capital to flow freely across its
borders. That was China’s trilemma. If the exchange rate is fixed but the
country is open to cross-border capital flows, it cannot have an independent
monetary policy. That was Britain’s trilemma. And if a country chooses free
capital mobility and wants monetary autonomy, it has to allow its currency to
float. That is the two-from-three combination that most modern economies
choose.
Many emerging markets find that tying the exchange rate to a
stable monetary anchor, such as the dollar, can be useful. It is a speedy way
to show a serious intent to control inflation, for instance. Indeed this was also
the reason why Britain tied itself to the D-mark in the early 1990s. The cost
is a loss of monetary independence: interest-rate policy is subordinated to
maintaining the peg and so cannot be used flexibly to stabilise the economy.
That is why countries are generally advised to float their currencies once they
have demonstrated a commitment to low inflation. That way, the currency adjusts
to the waxing and waning of capital flows, allowing interest rates to respond
to the domestic business cycle. In practice, many emerging markets are fearful
of letting the exchange rate move sharply, so they choose to sacrifice either
free capital mobility (by introducing capital controls, or by adding to or
depleting their foreign-currency reserves) or monetary independence, by giving
priority to currency stability over other targets. China wants eventually to
liberalise its capital account as a stepping stone to a modern financial
system. To do so, it will have to live with a volatile yuan. Three out of three
ain’t possible, but two out of three ain’t bad.
Previously in this series
Monday: Akerlof’s
market for lemons
Tuesday: The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
Wednesday: The Nash equilibrium
Thursday: The Keynesian multiplier
Friday: Minsky’s financial cycle
Tuesday: The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
Wednesday: The Nash equilibrium
Thursday: The Keynesian multiplier
Friday: Minsky’s financial cycle
Over the past several weeks The Economist has
run two-page briefs on six
seminal economics ideas. Read the full brief on the macro-economic
policy trilemma, or
click here to download a
PDF containing all six of the articles.
Oh my God, this is too complex, too much text. Find something easier please, people.
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