Richard Dudman (far left), Malcolm Caldwell (far right), the author, and Commander Pin, a senior Khmer Rouge military figure, stand near Cambodia's eastern border. (Courtesy of Elizabeth Becker) |
Reporting massive human rights abuses behind a façade
Two reporters escaped with their lives, but left Cambodia with very different stories. History shows one was right.
Last year, I
was flown to Cambodia to testify as an expert witness for the
prosecution at the genocide trial of two senior Khmer Rouge leaders. As a
journalist and author, I assumed my biggest challenge would be
protecting any confidential sources while maintaining a reporter’s right
to refuse to testify. I consulted an attorney and assured myself on
both counts. Then I pored over documents and interview transcripts,
preparing for tough questioning from the defense.
I testified for three long days in a somber courtroom in Phnom Penh. I
repeatedly insisted that the defense attorneys explain each flimsy
allegation before I answered their questions, and spoke slowly to insure
I didn’t make any foolish mistakes. I held back tears discussing the
assassination of a British professor I’d witnessed in 1978.
The United States had called the continuing Cambodian tribunal the
most important human rights trial in the world today. At the trial I
attended, the last two surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan, were finally being held accountable for their role in the
radical and savage revolution that killed over two million Cambodians—a
quarter of the population—between 1975 and 1979.
Yet despite all my preparations, there was one big surprise: The
trial inadvertently resolved a 37-year-old disagreement between two
reporters over how to cover genocide. Fundamentally, it was a classic
clash of reporting styles. I was a young journalist who had learned
about Cambodia’s culture, history, politics, and language and, above
all, had lived with its people. My colleague and competitor was a senior
reporter based in Washington with deep experience covering the State
Department and US foreign policy who visited or parachuted into many
foreign countries to cover world events, but who had not lived in
Cambodia.
While our story is from another era, its basic thesis is timeless.
Genocide is only obvious in hindsight. When a regime is murdering its
people, it is close to impossible to find real-time evidence of
atrocities. Instead, reporters must navigate strong-arm propaganda and
outright lies to uncover the truth behind charges of gross human rights
violations. Critics, power brokers, and even colleagues in the press
will deny the findings. But it is a reporter’s responsibility to get
answers.
My testimony had been highly anticipated because I was one of only
two Western journalists ever allowed to report from Cambodia under the
Khmer Rouge, and one of the first reporters to
interview Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge leader who has been called the Hitler
of Cambodia. The other was my aforementioned senior colleague, Richard
Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
I had gone to Cambodia for the first time in late 1972, abandoning a
graduate program in South Asian studies to report on the last country to
become part of America’s Vietnam War. I quickly became the local
correspondent for The Washington Post, a rare opportunity for a
woman at the time. For two years—1973 and 1974—I lived in Cambodia and
lived through the war. I got to know the country fairly well, traveling
widely, relying on Cambodian friends, and learning to speak some of the
Cambodian language.
Afterwards, I joined the Post staff in Washington, but never
forgot Cambodia. And in December 1978, I got a rare opportunity to
return. The only news about Cambodia at that time came
from official broadcasts or refugees who managed to escape. Under the
radical communist Khmer Rouge, Cambodia had isolated itself more
thoroughly than any other nation on the planet, including North Korea.
Refugees told harrowing stories of mass starvation, labor camps, and
arbitrary executions, describing the country as a living hell. But those
were the stories of Cambodians who had fled. No defectors had made it
out to the West, and no reporter had gotten inside. Were those stories
true?
The Cambodian government invited three outsiders to tell the country’s story: Dudman of the Post-Dispatch;
Malcolm Caldwell, a British professor specializing in Southeast Asia;
and me. The regime had let us in because it had ignited a border war
with its former ally Vietnam, and Cambodian leaders wanted international
help blocking a pending Vietnamese invasion.
While our story is from another era, its basic thesis is timeless. Genocide is only obvious in hindsight.
As soon as we arrived, it was clear that we would have no freedom of
movement. Instead, our visit was the equivalent of a guided tour under
armed guard. We would only see what the Khmer Rouge wanted us to see.
This was the same strategy the German Nazis had used when they
allowed the International and Danish Red Cross to visit their
Theresienstadt camp ghetto in Czechoslovakia during World War II—one of
the rare Red Cross inspections of any Nazi camp. The Nazis tidied up
Theresienstadt by painting barracks, planting gardens, and organizing
musician prisoners to entertain the visitors. The Red Cross delegation
was taken in, reporting back to the Danish government
that the camp had comfortable housing and a rich cultural life,
including a library and social club with its own orchestra. After the
Red Cross visit, the camp resumed its inhumane work of transporting
victims to their deaths in Auschwitz and other concentration camps.
Dudman and I had the same responsibility as those Red Cross workers
to discern the existence of a possible genocide behind the official
façade.
Documenting genocide is a staggering responsibility at any time, and
an especially difficult one for us in 1978, when the world was still
locked in the Cold War. The competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union had essentially neutralized any internationally
approved investigation of mass atrocities or genocide. The Nuremberg
trials of alleged Nazi war criminals in the late 1940s were the last
prosecution for genocide—the last time the two superpowers could agree
on a trial. We knew that no matter what we discovered, it was highly
unlikely that the UN or any other international body would call for the
arrest and trial of the Khmer Rouge.
Dudman, Caldwell, and I spent nearly every minute of
the two-week trip together. The totalitarian regime set up a tight
schedule, deciding where we would go, whom we would see and talk to, and
what propaganda point would be made at each stop. At night, we were
locked inside guest houses.
What I saw when I returned to Phnom Penh was a
capital city emptied of people….It was a shock and a nightmare to see
the city transformed into a near-ghost town.
In theory, we should have come to similar if not identical
conclusions. Yet Dudman and I perceived Cambodia very differently. A
senior diplomatic correspondent at the time, Dudman wrote his stories
based on a previous trip to the country, his readings about Cambodia,
and exactly what he saw during our visit. After two weeks in the
country, he came to the conclusion that he had seen “a generally healthy
population,” and that the people were “clearly not being worked to
death and starved to death.”
“Physical life may have improved for peasants and former urban
workers, possibly for the vast majority of the population,” he wrote in
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch upon our return.
My reporting was based on the same two weeks’ experience, but in the context of what I knew was missing. The Cambodian society I’d gotten to know in the early ’70s was
still vibrant, even in the midst of war. The Cambodians I met were
generous, welcoming family and friends uprooted by the fighting into
their increasingly crowded homes. The arts still thrived, from Cambodian
movies and rock and roll to the traditional ballet that evokes the
majestic art of the temple complex at Angkor. If anything, Cambodians in
that period had been too naïve, failing to understand how joining the
American-led Vietnam War in 1970, including the massive 1973 American
bombing campaign of Cambodia, would contribute to their nation’s defeat
and the nightmare of the Khmer Rouge a few years later.
What I saw when I returned to Phnom Penh was a capital city emptied
of people. I had read the reports from refugees that said Cambodians had
been force-marched out of the towns and cities to the countryside,
where they lived in communal camps, worked in labor gangs, ate in
canteens, and had no private lives. They also said that hundreds of
thousands had simply been killed. Still, it was a shock and a nightmare
to see the city transformed into a near-ghost town.
In Phnom Penh, we only saw people when we were driven to model
clinics, political headquarters, or staged events. We were told that
workers occupied some buildings, but there was no semblance of normal
life. I snuck out twice from the guest house during our siesta hour and
saw blocks of abandoned buildings left to rot. On the first of these
forays, I ran into a group of workers in black pajamas who let me take
their photograph and then disappeared into a building. They seemed
almost afraid of me. The second time, I was caught. After that, the
guesthouses were locked during the day as well as at night.
All of the schools appeared to be shut down, so I asked where the
children were studying. Our high-ranking guide said they were learning
in the countryside. Pagodas, mosques, and churches were shuttered. All
commercial life was forbidden: There were no more markets, no stores, no
banks, no cafés. The old art-deco Central Market where farmers and
artisans once sold their wares was empty, and the land around it had
been planted with banana trees. There was no music, no
dancing, no movie theatres, no Cambodian soup or noodle vendors—none of
the daily Cambodian joie de vivre that had survived the war but
not this revolution. It occurred to me that this was how extreme
communism looked when the government owned everything and controlled all
aspects of life.
There was no music, no dancing, no movie
theatres, no Cambodian soup or noodle vendors—none of the daily
Cambodian joie de vivre that had survived the war but not this
revolution.
The curtain lifted only once, during a road trip to an agricultural
region. We were standing at an empty highway rest stop when, across the
road, I saw a single-file line of thin children, barefoot and in rags,
carrying light firewood. I grabbed my camera and took a few photographs
while our guide explained that these children were “students” learning
about farming.
I wanted to give the Khmer Rouge a chance to disprove the stories of
wholesale slaughter and deprivation. I asked my minders to let me
interview someone I might have known when I lived in Phnom Penh—someone
who could tell me that he or she was doing OK. Our guide refused. “You
will never understand Cambodia,” he told me. (Documents retrieved after
the fall of the Khmer Rouge revealed that my questions convinced them I
was a CIA agent.)
Then we ourselves became targets of the regime. On our last day,
Dudman and I interviewed Pol Pot for two hours. Immediately afterwards,
Caldwell, the professor, had a separate interview with him. We were all
relieved that the long, extremely difficult and nerve-wracking trip was
coming to a close, and we went to sleep just before midnight. But an
hour later, a Cambodian assassin attacked us in our guesthouse. I
heard a crash and ran from my bedroom to the living room, coming face
to face with a gunman who pointed his pistol at me. I ran and hid in a
bathtub while the assassin raced upstairs, where he saw Dudman, who ran
into his room and locked the door. Then I heard the sickening sound of
repeated gunshots, followed by silence.
I waited by myself in the dark for several fearful hours before we
were rescued. Dudman was safe, I was told, but Caldwell had been
murdered. The Khmer Rouge foreign minister blamed the Vietnamese for
Caldwell’s murder. Still traumatized, I said, no, the gunman was
Cambodian. I knew a regime that controlled our every move could have
protected us from that assassin. I had to conclude that they wanted
Caldwell dead, and to frighten Dudman and me. (Years later, a scholar
found documents in the Khmer Rouge archives showing that several
low-level Khmer Rouge figures were tortured and executed for killing
Caldwell.)
I heard a crash and ran from my bedroom to the
living room, coming face to face with a gunman who pointed his pistol
at me. I ran and hid in a bathtub while the assassin raced upstairs,
where he saw Dudman, who ran into his room and locked the door.
Writing in the Post-Dispatch, Dudman reported that the
“information received in advance [from refugees] was mostly misleading,”
and that he had found a “healthy demographic mix of men, women and
babies.”
He also wrote that under communism, Cambodia had become “one huge
work camp, but its people clearly were not being worked to death or
starved to death.” He won several prestigious awards for his work,
including the Weintal Prize for diplomatic reporting and a George Polk
Award following his 1990 New York Times essay insisting that Pol Pot may have been brutal, but was no mass murderer.
Meanwhile, I wrote that I believed the regime was guilty of committing gross human rights abuses in a series for The Washington Post, describing all that we’d seen and not seen. For my efforts, I won an honorable mention from the Overseas Press Club.
It was a standoff. The Khmer Rouge had the sympathies of some
American activists still incensed over the Vietnam War. Noam Chomsky
dismissed my work and said Dudman was the more reliable reporter.
Incredibly, even the US government took Dudman’s side. The Vietnamese
invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, opening up a
treasure trove of documents and horrific evidence that implicated the
regime in far worse crimes than anyone had imagined. But after
condemning the Khmer Rouge while Pol Pot was in power, the US did an
about-face and supported the Khmer Rouge in exile.
Embittered by the outcome of the Vietnam War and taking the side of
China against the Soviet Union in the great communist split, Presidents
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush decided that
Vietnam’s defeat of the Khmer Rouge and occupation of Cambodia was the
real problem. The US refused to even discuss the massive human rights
abuses under the Khmer Rouge, instead treating its exiled leaders as
equal partners in war and at the peace tables. For a decade, the US
voted to let the Khmer Rouge keep the Cambodia seat at
the United Nations, and, through a political coalition, supported the
regime’s army fighting against Vietnam. When pushed, US officials would
say that yes, they were aware of “the violence Pol Pot perpetrated,” but
Cambodian independence was more important.
Hollywood, though, helped change that narrative by producing a film
that shattered public ignorance and brought to life the stories that
many journalists were writing. I worked as a consultant on The Killing Fields, which told the true story of New York Times
reporter Sydney Schanberg and his Cambodian colleague, Dith Pran. They
cover the war together, with Schanberg escaping at the end and Pran
forced to stay behind and suffer through the Khmer Rouge regime. It was
devastating. Finally, the general public understood that Pol Pot had
overseen another Holocaust. The film won three Academy Awards and
forever changed the debate.
I kept thinking I’d turn a corner and I’d see
real life. I’d run into some kids playing a game, or some women
talking….Cambodians are lively people, but there was nothing. What was
missing was almost profoundly more upsetting to me than what was there.”
A year later, my own investigative history of the Khmer Rouge, When the War Was Over,
was published. It offered one of the first full descriptions of how the
regime came to power, portraits of its leaders and the victims, and how
the murderous and incompetent revolution ruined the country and its
people, erasing one of Asia’s oldest societies. I relied on Khmer Rouge
records and interviews with survivors and regime leaders, and included a
full description of our fateful 1978 trip, even documents showing how
the Khmer Rouge manipulated our every move. Importantly, the book argued
that the regime had committed genocide.
This time around, the response was warmer. Reviews in The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, and
others praised it, calling it a “work of the first importance” and “the
definitive book on the Cambodian revolution.” But that didn’t bring a
trial any closer. Cambodians had to wait another 20 years—until
2005—before the international community officially recognized the hell
they’d endured by creating a war crimes tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations and Cambodia.
Given all of that history, I was surprised when the Khmer Rouge defense attorneys resurrected the now-forgotten debate about the difference between my reporting and Dudman’s.
I was the first to testify; Dudman was to follow me weeks later as a
defense witness. Red-robed judges presided from an elevated bench. Below
them, purple-robed prosecutors and victims’ attorneys sat on one side,
black-robed defense attorneys on the other. A bulletproof glass wall
separated the courtroom from an auditorium, where the
general public—including Cambodians and foreign visitors—listened
through headphones to testimony translated into French, English, or
Cambodian. I sat in the witness chair, facing the judges, my back to the
audience.
It is not enough to report what you saw….You
must consider what you were not seeing, what the country was like
before, and keep asking questions. Genocide is a story few people want
to hear, and that those in power often don’t want told.
Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne began by asking me to
explain how I had reached my conclusions in 1978. “I kept thinking I’d
turn a corner and I’d see real life. I’d run into some kids playing a
game, or some women talking,” I said. “Cambodians are lively people, but
there was nothing. What was missing was almost profoundly more
upsetting to me than what was there.”
The prosecutors came next, asking mostly friendly questions. But I
was treated as a hostile witness by the defense attorneys representing
the two surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders on trial for crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and genocide. They
pitted me against Dudman, pointing out that I had been just 31 at the
time of the trip, while he had been a 60-year-old diplomatic
correspondent with a distinguished career. The defense attorney asked
why the court should accept my analysis that the regime was guilty of
genocide when Dudman had won the prestigious accolades for his more
generous interpretation.
I expressed respect for Dudman’s integrity. But it isn’t easy to
politely disagree after being sworn to tell the truth in a case
involving the death of two million Cambodians. As far as I was
concerned, the matter had long since been settled. Documents and
eyewitness accounts discovered and amassed for the trial show the Khmer
Rouge were among the 20th century’s worst criminals. Tuol Sleng, the
regime’s main prison and torture chamber where thousands were falsely
accused and executed, had even been turned into a gruesome museum that
has become the most popular tourist spot in Phnom Penh.
The defense then called Dudman. Now 97, he testified by remote video
link from Bangor, Maine. He was alert for his age, and honest. While at
times he gave exact and riveting details of our trip, he often admitted
that his memory failed him.
Dudman stood by his reporting, saying he wrote what he’d seen and
experienced. He said that when he wrote the articles, he believed he was
telling the truth.
The defense attorney then told Dudman that I’d said I admired him,
but was saddened when he gave Pol Pot the benefit of the doubt. Dudman
answered that no one likes to be criticized. He said he had shown a
reporter’s skepticism. But he credited me with having spent more time in
Cambodia than he and said I had “a longer perspective.”
Then the defense asked Dudman if, in hindsight, he considered his
reporting “too positive or too uncritical.” To everyone’s apparent
surprise, Dudman said yes. He had changed his mind about the Khmer
Rouge.
“From everything that I have read since then, I think there was genocide under the Pol Pot regime,” he said.
The defense had lost Dudman.
I found his comments heartening and admirably self-deprecating. It is
not enough to report what you saw. Indeed, covering a tyrannical regime
that controls your every move and determines everything you hear and
everyone you come in contact with requires more than skepticism. You
must consider what you were not seeing, what the country was like
before, and keep asking questions. Genocide is a story few people want
to hear, and that those in power often don’t want told.
Recently, I telephoned Dudman and asked about his testimony. He said he stood by his answers in court and referred me to an article he wrote for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch not long after he testified.
In it, he wrote that our entire 1978 trip and what
came afterwards had left him “troubled.” “I wonder how I would have
behaved if I had been a correspondent in Germany during the early rise
to power of Adolf Hitler. Would I first have tried to report his side of
the story? How long would it have taken me to realize that he was all
bad and that any sympathy or even-handedness would have been misplaced?
The short answer is I don’t know.”
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were found guilty of crimes against
humanity and sentenced to life in prison. Their trial on charges of
genocide continues.
Elizabeth Becker is the award-winning author of When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge. She has been the International Economics Correspondent for The New York Times, a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post, and Senior Foreign Editor of National Public Radio. Video of the tribunal is available here.
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