[Vietnamization: Military, Occupation, PRK, K5 Genocide, Indochina] CAMBODIA: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime? CIA Intelligence Assessment, 1986

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Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?

An Intelligence Assessment

June 1986

Directorate of Intelligence

This paper was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis, with a contribution from Office of Leadership Analysis.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA.

Key Judgments

Information available as of 1 May 1986 was used in this report.

Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?

Vietnam has implemented an ambitious strategy over the past two years to lower its profile in Cambodia by turning over more responsibilities to its client People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime. Hanoi is motivated both by the need to curb rising anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia and a desire to escape the international isolation brought about by its occupation of Cambodia.

However, development of PRK institutions has been slow and erratic. The government is still dominated by Vietnamese advisers, the Army remains politically unreliable and tactically inept, and the Communist Party has been unable to assert the leading role ascribed to it. We believe Hanoi will have to support the regime indefinitely through a large military and advisory presence despite a public pledge in 1985 to withdraw its forces— which we currently estimate at 130,000 to 140,000 by   1990. Hanoi still maintains 40,000 to 50,000 troops in Laos more than 10 years after the Communist takeover there, and, in our view, will be hard pressed to reduce its personnel in Cambodia to a comparable level any time soon.

Hanoi appears to recognize that the PRK's weakness renders its withdrawal timetable unrealistic, and we believe it will have to use subterfuges, such as incorporating Vietnamese troops into Cambodian units, to conceal its presence beyond 1990. In the meantime, we expect Vietnam to promote aggressively an image that the PRK is making rapid progress toward internal self-sufficiency in hopes of eroding international support for the Cambodian resistance. Hanoi hopes that propaganda efforts [e.g. the racist Khmer using “Yuon” as derogatory], along with containment of the resistance and at least modest PRK headway, will hasten acceptance—either tacit or through negotiations—of its dominance over Cambodia.

Although Hanoi, in our view, will be able to maintain and slowly consolidate its hold on Cambodia over the next few years, several developments, such as changes in Vietnam's aging leadership, a marked improvement in the performance of the resistance, or major PRK advances toward self-reliance, might induce Hanoi to make minor concessions. We believe Hanoi is unlikely, however, to compromise on its fundamental goal of a Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese security bloc.

Contents

Key Judgments

Where Matters Stand

-         Pol Pot's Legacy

-         The Resistance Challenge

Security: The Essential Precondition

-         Main Forces

-         Local Forces

-         Militia

-         The Border Front: The PRK's Maginot Line

Nurturing the Communist Party

-         The Current PRK Leadership

Moving Toward 1990

-         Vietnamese-PRK Dynamics

-         Hanoi's External Calculations

-         Alternate Scenarios

Appendix

-         Leading PRK Officials

Cambodia: How Viable the Heng Samrin Regime?

Where Matters Stand

Seven and a half years after invading Cambodia, Vietnam is trying to reduce its presence by turning over more responsibilities to the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime it installed in Phnom Penh in January 1979 (see inset). From Hanoi's standpoint, "Cambodianization" is imperative not only to forestall a deepening nationalist backlash in Cambodia, but also for Vietnam to escape from the isolation imposed by its neighbors and most Western countries in retribution for its invasion and occupation. But Hanoi's calculations are predicated heavily on the dubious proposition that the client regime in Phnom Penh can develop sufficiently to manage its affairs largely on its own—particularly in security matters. The Heng Samrin—led PRK has thus far displayed little capacity for governing, and recent trends in resistance activity and popular sentiment—though far from conclusive—suggest even its limited capabilities have eroded. Mutinies have been reported among some frontline PRK Army units, and refugees, news reporters, and visitors tell of growing anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Although such accounts are often selfserving and exaggerated, they are sufficiently credible, in our view, to underscore the probability that Hanoi will not be able to meet its announced deadline of 1990 for withdrawing its troops from Cambodia.

P0l Pot's Legacy. The principal barriers to PRK progress lie in Cambodia's inherent weaknesses. Between 1975 and 1978, the brutal Pol Pot regime destroyed or disrupted much of the fabric of Cambodian life in its ultrarevolutionary zeal. Public institutions such as banks were abolished, religion was brutally suppressed, and the cities were emptied as part of the regime's agrarian reforms. Many of the country's intelligentsia died at the hands of Khmer Rouge or from the hardships they inflicted, while others fled, leaving the country with little human capacity for reconstruction once the Khmer Rouge were evicted. An article in the Soviet newspaper Pravda in March 1986 noted that Kampong Chhnang Province, for example, had only one qualified doctor, three medical assistants, and six secondary school teachers out of a population of 250,000

Although the economy is slowly recovering from the devastation of the Pol Pot years, it has not regained pre-1970 levels. The pace of commerce has picked up somewhat, largely because of an influx of Vietnamese petty traders and merchants, but agricultural and industrial production have been slow to develop. […] The population has managed to meet minimum subsistence rice requirements, but cultivated areas amount to less than 1.9 million hectares, compared with 2.5 million hectares before 1970

Shortages of fertilizer, inadequate irrigation systems, and insufficient supplies of high-yield rice varieties are inhibiting substantial agricultural improvements. Although improved supplies of consumer goods in Phnom Penh markets compared with three or four years ago, most observers agree that reconstruction of Cambodia's economy will require many years because of the lack of capital and skilled manpower. Even with Soviet or Vietnamese assistance in rehabilitating and constructing light industrial facilities, the difficult internal security situation and inadequate transportation and electric power systems will inhibit recovery.

Le Duc Anh

Top Vietnamese strategist on Cambodia and architect of comprehensive overhaul of strategy adopted in 1984 senior general since December 1984 (highest rank in Vietnamese Army) and member of the Politburo since 1982 . . . as head of Vietnam's B-68 advisory apparatus in Cambodia until at least late 1985, controlled all major policy decisions by the PRK Government . . . from southern Vietnam. served with North Vietnamese forces in Mekong Delta and Saigon region in early 1950s . . . became deputy commander of southern headquarters in 1968 . . . deputy commander of North Vietnamese command that captured Saigon in 1975 . . . since 1981 commander of Ministry of National Defense Forward Command in Ho Chi Minh City, responsible for southern Vietnam and Cambodia . . . about 67 years old [as of June 1986]

Le Duc Anh 's Blueprint for Cambodianization

Senior Gen. Le Duc Anh has emerged in the past three years as the top Vietnamese authority on Cambodia, a position formerly held by Le Duc Tho. Anh, who became a Politburo member in 1982, presented the most authoritative outline of Vietnam 's revised strategy and perspective on Cambodia in Vietnam's Army journal in late 1984. The article enunciated a major shift in Vietnamese thinking from the early years of the Cambodian occupation, when the resistance was considered a declining "banditry” element, to a position that postulated a much more imposing threat requiring a coordinated multifaceted strategy

Anh set forth five precepts:

•        Indochina is a single theater of operations, embracing a socialist alliance and a strategic and combat alliance on a unified war theater embracing political, military, economic, and cultural fields.

•        The success of the Cambodian revolution will be decided by the Cambodians themselves.

•        The Cambodian people must be mobilized under party leadership to contribute to national defense.

•        There are two fronts—border and inland—both of which are important, but the inland front is the decisive one.

•        Building a PRK Army is an urgent strategic demand.

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The Resistance Challenge. Hanoi and its client regime in Phnom Penh are still faced with guerrilla activity in many areas of the interior despite the success of Vietnam's 1984/85 dry-season military offensive (see inset). Khmer Rouge forces have adapted to the loss of their bases along the Thai border by shifting most of their operations to Cambodia's interior. They have singled out local PRK administrative entities in particular to undermine popular confidence in the regime. […] Despite their notoriety, the Khmer Rouge derive support from the populace in many rural areas, where the reach of any central government has traditionally been limited. At the same time, we believe most Cambodians still fear and detest the Khmer Rouge; and their increased operations, though worrisome to Hanoi, pose no imminent threat to Vietnam's control.

The non-Communist resistance forces—the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Sihanoukist National Army (ANS)—were damaged seriously by Vietnam's 1984/85 offensive and have been slow in reorienting themselves toward an interior guerrilla effort. Nevertheless, both groups—despite chronic factionalism—have in- creased infiltration to the interior […] Although most non-Communist troops remain close to the Thai border, we believe they command some sympathy from the local people, which complicates PRK consolidation efforts.

Security: The Essential Precondition

Hanoi considers the establishment of a secure and reliable PRK security apparatus essential for carrying out its announced plans to withdraw its own forces by 1990. Despite its outward bravado, Vietnam recognizes that much difficult work remains. A Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) directive issued in March 1986 emphasized that the defense of the country remained a life-or-death question and that efforts to eradicate its enemies remained arduous and protracted. The directive ordered the highest possible rate of military conscription, continuation of the civilian mobilization begun in 1984 to build a border defense line, and the consolidation of internal security through the building of strong regional, militia, and police forces.

The stepped-up conscription effort highlights the latest of many Vietnamese-inspired efforts since 1979 to build the PRK regular Army as the country's first line of defense. Results, however, have come slowly for the Vietnamese, and […] continuing troop desertions and mutinies indicate that many hurdles remain.

Main Forces. There is little in the PRK Army's past record, in our view, to suggest it will come close to achieving such an ambitious objective any time soon. Despite intensive efforts to expand the number and strength of PRK main force units since 1979, only five understrength divisions totaling about 15,000 troops now exist. Hanoi has attempted since 1982 to wean such units from dependence on Vietnamese mentor units by moving PRK units into frontline areas along the Thai border [suicide mission of Cambodian men]. Although each attempt has been accompanied by large-scale desertions, Hanoi has persisted, and each of the five divisions now has responsibility for important sectors of the border. According to PRK and Vietnamese defectors, Hanoi still has little confidence in the ability of the PRK Army to hold its own, however, and has not been able to reduce substantially its own presence along the Thai border

In addition to the absence of an educated, technically proficient manpower base, efforts to build a competent and reliable PRK Army have been undercut by a variety of psychological factors. Few Cambodians willingly assume the risks and hardships of military life, particularly under the tutelage of the long-hated Vietnamese. By a similar token, many PRK troops are reluctant to fight against fellow Cambodians in the resistance—frequent instances of desertion, fraternization, and defection attest to this.

Although these psychological factors appear likely to bedevil the Vietnamese indefinitely, at least limited headway is being made in developing the military. Defectors report that at least one PRK armor regiment has been formed from 50 to 100 tanks delivered by the Soviet Union over the past two years […] for first time the presence in Cambodia of Soviet-made SA-3 surface-to-air missile equipment that will probably be used to defend the airfield. The Soviets have provided several patrol boats for an embryonic PRK Navy in the past two years. Defectors indicate that several hundred PRK military officers and troops go to Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe yearly for training. The return of increasing numbers of trained personnel should gradually enhance the leadership and technical capabilities that are now so deficient in the PRK Armed Forces.

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The PRK Army includes about 15,000 troops in main force military units and another 15,000 to 25,000 in provincial military commands. Militia and self-defense units at the village level are not counted as regular forces, although Vietnamese and PRK military strategy require close coordination between regular forces and militia units at the local level. The goal of a 100,000-man regular army corresponds closely to the 90,000 troops under arms in the Pol Pot era.

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Evolution of Hanoi 's Strategic Outlook and Game Plan

Hanoi's ultimate goal in Cambodia, in our view, is to have a regime as nearly self-sufficient in internal affairs as possible, but functioning as a component of a larger Indochinese security bloc under Hanoi's control. Hanoi has long regarded a cohesive grouping of the Indochinese states as essential to its long-term national security goals and regional political ambitions. Senior Gen. Le Duc Anh, the top Vietnamese military strategist on Cambodia, wrote in late 1984 that "Indochina is a (single) theater of operations, and the strategic and combat alliance" of the three countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) is essential to the survival and development of each country and the group as a whole.

Although it would have preferred a more subtle and less costly alternative than invasion in bringing Cambodia to heel in such an arrangement, there is little doubt, in our view, that Hanoi will remain steadfast in pursuit of its strategic objectives, now that they appear to Hanoi to be within reach. The invasion of northern Vietnam launched by China in early 1979 in retaliation for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, continuing Chinese military pressure since then, and Beijing's aid to the Cambodian resistance have reaffirmed, in Hanoi's eyes, the imperative for a united and enduring Indochinese front. Hanoi views Thailand's cooperation with China as further evidence of the need to make Cambodia, and in turn Vietnam itself, secure from external threat.

1979-83: The Waiting Game. With Hanoi's commitment to these strategic assumptions never seriously in doubt, the issue among the leadership in Hanoi has generally centered on what tactics were best suited to resolve the Cambodian problem on the terms most favorable to Vietnam. From 1979 to late 1983, Hanoi appeared confident that time was on its side. The military resistance was derisively labeled merely a "banditry" problem, and Hanoi was optimistic that the diplomatic opposition spearheaded by ASEAN and China would in time dissipate. Although Vietnam mounted sporadic "offensives" in most dry seasons, their effects were localized and short lived, and Hanoi devised no conclusive military strategy toward the resistance. Meanwhile, with Chinese aid, the Khmer Rouge was reinvigorated and ASEANChinese collaboration allowed the two non-Communist resistance groups under Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk to achieve impressive numerical growth through 1983. Diplomatic opposition, moreover, gained momentum and Hanoi found itself increasingly isolated, particularly in the United Nations.

In 1983 the Khmer Rouge mounted its most aggressive interior campaign since the invasion, and by early 1984 highly exaggerated accounts of its exploits were receiving widespread international publicity. Non-Communist resistance forces, buoyed by their numerical growth, also mounted limited forays deeper into the interior than before. Hanoi, meanwhile, appeared to be on a diplomatic offensive and held its troops in abeyance despite apparent gains by the resistance. When its diplomatic initiatives—highlighted by Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach 's visits early in 1984 to Australia and Indonesia—failed to produce progress, Hanoi immediately invoked the military option.

1984 Onward: Acknowledgment of a Threat. At that point, Vietnam and the PRK abandoned their pretense that the resistance was composed mainly of bandit elements and openly acknowledged that the PRK's enemies posed a continuing serious threat. Several hastily prepared attacks were mounted against key resistance bases at the end of the dry season in March and April 1984. Vietnamese forces for the first time maintained strong border positions in the ensuing rainy season in contrast to their normal pullbacks to the interior. They proceeded in the November 1984—May 1985 dry season to destroy the remaining major resistance bases along the Thai border in an unprecedented military offensive.

Keeping the Heat On. Since the offensive, the PRK's border defense program has moved into high gear, complemented by mining and patrolling of resistance infiltration routes by Vietnamese and PRK forces and a psychological warfare program to entice defections from the ranks of the resistance. Nevertheless, the resistance, particularly the Khmer Rouge, has successfully shifted its focus to the interior and mounted attacks in widespread areas. Although this has resulted in a deterioration of internal security, we believe Hanoi is willing to accept such costs over the short term in gambling that it can permanently stabilize the so-called border front. Once it believes the border is adequately secured, we expect Hanoi will begin shifting the nine divisions currently near the border to the interior, leaving border defense largely in the hands of the PRK Army. […] Both PRK and Vietnamese writings, however, acknowledge that securing the interior is a much more complex problem, requiring coordinated military, political, and economic measures by a client regime that is still poorly suited to mount them.

In the wake of the 1984/85 dry-season offensive, Hanoi also took the public relations initiative by announcing, for the first time, a specific date— 1990—by which all its troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia. This pledge, however, carried a proviso that would allow Hanoi to maintain troops if hostile forces threatened Cambodian security. Vietnamese diplomats have since offered to move the withdrawal deadline to 1987 (if an acceptable solution to the Cambodian problem could be negotiated by then.

Local Forces. Parallel with efforts to build main force divisions to defend Cambodia's borders, Vietnam has developed a local forces apparatus in each of the 19 provinces. […] we calculate that these forces number 15,000 to 25,000, but they probably will be substantially expanded under the present intensified conscription campaign. Hanoi appears to have encountered better fortune in building these forces than main force units.  Troops in provincial units generally are stationed near their homes, and until recently they have not faced nearly as serious a threat from resistance forces as have frontline main force units. Their strength ranges from several 200- to 300-man battalions in such high-threat areas as Batdambang [Battambang] and Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey [Siem Reap–Oddar Meanchey] Provinces to a single, probably understrength battalion in each of the more remote or secure provinces.

PRK provincial forces have developed under the mechanism of joint Vietnamese-PRK "groups," in which provincial military units from "sister provinces" in Vietnam have helped establish a security apparatus in counterpart Cambodian provinces. The duties of groups range from joint sweep operations against the resistance to the formation, training, and political indoctrination of PRK provincial forces. The Vietnamese military components in the groups appear subordinate to a separate, province-level specialist team. The specialist teams coordinate and direct the overall development of a PRK governmental and security apparatus and Communist party organization in each province. In some of the more secure provinces, such as Svay Rieng, the military components apparently have been reduced or withdrawn, leaving only a predominantly civilian specialist team in place. […] the joint Vietnamese-PRK groups in most provinces would be abolished this year following the nominal dissolution of three such units in 1985. Nonetheless, we believe most of these entities will probably be retained in some other guise, although selective withdrawals of some units are likely.

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Increased Khmer Rouge attacks on local government facilities since late 1985, however, have imposed added burdens on local forces in some areas.

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Militia. The third major component of the PRK security apparatus—the local militia—has received increasing emphasis over the past year. Under Gen. Le Duc Anh's blueprint, the local militia forces responsible for village and hamlet security form a vital part of the "inland front." No reliable estimates of the number of people in militia units are available, but, in our judgment, they are probably at least in the tens of thousands and growing. In many areas most threatened by resistance activity, formation of militia units has been accompanied by construction of so-called combat villages similar to the strategic hamlets built in South Vietnam in the late 1950s. […] In some cases, the Vietnamese have relocated thousands of civilians to such villages. A Vietnamese military journal claimed in June 1984 that up to that point more than 300 "combat villages" and 4,000 "combat hamlets" had been established throughout Cambodia.

The Border Front: The PRK's Maginot Line. Parallel with its 1984/85 dry-season destruction of major resistance bases, Hanoi instituted a "border defense campaign" to construct a network of barriers along the 750-kilometer Thai-Cambodian border.  […] the PRK issued "Circular K-5" in July 1984, mobilizing Cambodian workers throughout the country to clear forests, dig defensive ditches, and build dams and strategic roads along the border to thwart guerrilla infiltration and enhance the mobility and logistic efficiency of Vietnamese and PRK forces. An important initial objective of the K-5 campaign was to prevent resistance forces from recapturing territory by facilitating the year-round deployment of Vietnamese and PRK forces along the Thai border. In previous years, Vietnamese dry-season military gains had been largely negated by Hanoi's inability or unwillingness to maintain a strong border posture during the rainy season. The long-term objective of the campaign, however, is to make infiltration of resistance forces and supplies into the interior increasingly dangerous and difficult, ultimately forcing guerrillas to abandon the fight. Vietnamese authorities have acknowledged that completely sealing the border is impossible, but they apparently believe the campaign is a vital component of the border front against the PRK's enemies.

The K-5 program continued throughout the recent dry season, with thousands of civilian laborers from interior provinces serving three-month stints along the border. The program, however, has produced a public relations backlash for Hanoi and the PRK, with widespread evasion and desertions reported. Many workers have been killed or injured by mines or have contracted malaria. More important, the military effectiveness of the border defense line has been spotty. Although […] guerrilla logistics have been hampered in some areas, the increased attacks by Khmer Rouge forces in the interior since late last year indicate that the barriers remain porous. Non-Communist forces have also been able to move more guerrillas into the interior since the beginning of 1986. A senior non-Communist resistance official recently told a US Embassy officer that guerrillas had little difficulty penetrating or circumventing the PRK barriers. A further indicator of the ineffectiveness of the K-5 plan is that it has not allowed any substantial reduction in Vietnamese troops in the border regions

Long-term prospects for the border defense program are uncertain at best, in our view. The program is clearly unpopular, and the defensive works will require continuous maintenance if they are to have more than a temporary effect. Moreover, their utility will be greatly undermined unless the PRK military can effectively patrol the infiltration routes used by resistance forces.

Nurturing the Communist Party

Although Hanoi's principal emphasis has been on establishing a security apparatus for the PRK regime, it looks to the Cambodian Communist Party as the principal institution for consolidating long-term control over the regime's internal affairs. The absence of a party structure at the time of the Vietnamese takeover required that the party be organized from the top down. Hanoi drew the top officials primarily from those former Khmer Rouge officers and officials who rebelled against Pol Pot in 1978 and 1979 (see the appendix). Although efforts to develop the party at grassroots levels also began in 1979, only in the past year or two has the regime made any claims of noteworthy success.

Despite generally upbeat assessments by party officials, many of the same problems cited at the 1981 party congress—when party leaders openly acknowledged the inadequacy of the party to perform its leadership mission—were cited by party General Secretary Heng Samrin as continuing issues at the Fifth Party Congress in October 1985:

•        Party organization remains too thin and weak, particularly at district and local levels, and has failed to take deep root even in state-run enterprises.

•        Serious shortages of leadership, economic, professional, and technical cadre remain.

•        The political commitment of many party cadre remains suspect, particularly their resolve to move against the PRK's enemies.

•        The reach of central party authority is still limited, and implementation of its policies is uneven in many parts of the country

The Current PRK Leadership. The Cambodian leadership, both at party and government levels, is almost entirely a creation of Vietnam. According to the US Embassy in Bangkok, at least seven of the nine Politburo members elected at the party congress in October 1985 have longstanding ties to Hanoi. The top three—party General Secretary Heng Samrin, National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim, and Prime Minister Hun Sen—are former Khmer Rouge leaders who fled the Pol Pot purges in 1977 and 1978 and joined Vietnam in overthrowing that regime. Hanoi's abrupt removal of independent-minded party leader Pen Sovan in late 1981 has, in our view, had a salutary effect on other PRK officials who may have entertained thoughts of staking out a nationalist stance beyond the limits imposed by Hanoi.

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As with the Armed Forces building the party has been slow and difficult. fewer than 70 anti—Khmer Rouge Cambodian Communists were on hand for the Party's Third Congress, an event contrived to develop legitimacy at the time of the Vietnamese invasion in early 1979. Not until May 1981 were enough party members—about 700—available to hold the next party congress, which adopted the official title of Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Although precise figures are not available, a Pravda article last year indicated K PR P membership had grown to 7,500, but it is not clear whether all are full party members

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Indeed, Hanoi apparently continues to exercise control over much of the PRK decisionmaking process. […] Group B-68 [the current commander is Vietnam’s Lt. Gen. Phung The Tai] a Vietnamese Communist Party organization established in Phnom Penh in 1979, continued to control all major policy decisions as of late 1985. Cambodian officials appear to have little independent power […] As a result of Hanoi's overwhelming presence, no PRK party or government official has attained any appreciable stature as a Cambodian nationalist, which, in our view, hampers the regime's effort to extend its writ in the countryside and to reduce popular resentment toward the Vietnamese.

Moving Toward 1990

Vietnamese-PRK Dynamics. A prime motivation in Vietnam's plans to "Cambodianize" the PRK is its concern that an open-ended and large presence there will bring historic Vietnamese-Khmer ethnic tensions increasingly to the fore, but the PR K 's slow development poses a dilemma for Hanoi, in our judgment. A precipitate or premature withdrawal of troops and advisers would risk allowing the resistance to make new inroads against or even to topple a weak PRK. At the same time, the continuing large-scale presence apparently deemed necessary by Hanoi to protect and strengthen the PRK adequately could fuel antiVietnamese sentiments. Both the Vietnamese and PR K leaderships have alluded to such tensions and the need to avoid inflaming them. Le Duc Anh has exhorted Vietnamese troops and advisers to respect Cambodian sovereignty and avoid manifestations of "big nation chauvinism" in their dealings with the Cambodian people. KPRP General Secretary Heng Samrin made a similar appeal at the 1985 party congress for Cambodians to close ranks with Vietnam and oppose enemy-inspired schemes to exploit historic tensions. […] senior PRK officials also see a dilemma for themselves. Many reportedly resent Vietnam's influence and fear Hanoi will reduce its presence to acceptable levels only when forced by popular pressure in the PRK. On the other hand, they grudgingly concede that an early Vietnamese pullout would risk a return of the feared Khmer Rouge.

A major element in the apparent rise in anti-Vietnamese sentiment has been the influx of Vietnamese settlers into Cambodia since the invasion. There is no credible evidence of an official Vietnamese policy to move settlers into Cambodia, and much of the migration appears to be individually motivated [sic! See A Shattered Society, Pen Sovann’s memoir, chapter 9 of When the War Was Over, Stephen Morris’s Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia].

Hanoi has done little to halt it, however, and Vietnamese settlers often receive preferential treatment such as immunity from some PRK laws. Large Vietnamese enclaves are reported to exist along the Tonle Sap and in Phnom Penh.

Reliable statistics are not available, but we estimate the total number of Vietnamese at roughly half a million [as many as 800,000 Vietnamese live in Cambodia but these figures are largely propagandistic, in our view]—approximately the number in Cambodia before the Pol Pot era. Although there is little doubt that the influx of settlers advances Hanoi’s control apparatus in Cambodia, unless Hanoi restrains the influx, we believe it will further fuel anti-Vietnamese passions.

Hanoi's External Calculations. Despite its outward confidence, we believe Hanoi recognizes that it will be required to maintain a sizable military and advisory presence in Cambodia well beyond its 1990 withdrawal deadline. In neighboring Laos, for example, Vietnam still maintains some 40,000 to 50,000 troops more than 10 years after the Communist takeover. We believe Hanoi will be hard pressed to reduce its presence in Cambodia even to this level over the next several years. The client PRK regime, along with its Army and party apparatus, in our judgment, is many years away from being able to stand on its own. Vietnamese officials have acknowledged to Western newsmen and diplomats that their troop withdrawal deadline and the PRK border defense program are intended as much to be psychological measures to prod the PRK into greater progress as they are concrete goals.

Given the likelihood that "Cambodianization" will achieve only partial success in the next few years, Hanoi will, in our view, heavily promote the perception that it is accomplishing its goals to exploit divisions in both the resistance and ASEAN. Vietnam probably calculates that over time, propaganda efforts, coupled with at least a containment of the resistance and modest PRK progress, will advance prospects for a favorable outcome for Hanoi along such lines as:

-         De facto acceptance by most ASEAN countries (Thailand being a probable exception) of Vietnamese control over Cambodia. Although an open break in ASEAN ranks on this issue is, in our judgment, unlikely, support to resistance forces would probably decline and the impact of the Cambodian issue as a constraint on Vietnamese behavior would gradually weaken. Hanoi would find it easier to pursue dual-track policies with opponents wherein the Cambodia issue—though not formally resolved—would not seriously impede other policy objectives such as improved economic ties.    

-         A negotiated settlement that would require only cosmetic concessions by Vietnam such as including prominent non-Communist resistance figures in a PRK-dominated government and containing guarantees that would emasculate the resistance. We believe this is Hanoi's preferred option as it would accord legitimacy to its control and more quickly eliminate the Cambodian issue as an impediment to other objectives.

-         To advance its public relations goals as well as outwardly meet its public commitment to withdraw by 1990, Hanoi will have to use subterfuges to conceal the presence we believe it will be required to maintain. These may include the integration of Vietnamese soldiers into PRK units and the transferral of some responsibilities to Vietnamese civilians. […] the Vietnamese were preparing to integrate Vietnamese troops into PRK divisions at an early date to strengthen PRK forces and allow Hanoi to claim its own troops were being withdrawn. [We have no conclusive evidence that Hanoi has actually begun implementing such a plan.]         

-         Hanoi will also continue its highly publicized annual troop withdrawals begun in 1982 as a necessary propaganda measure, even though these have had little impact on its military strength in Cambodia.  We do not believe any significant reduction in Vietnam's 130,000- to 140,000-man force will occur until Hanoi is better able to gauge the effects of apparently increased resistance activity by Khmer Rouge guerrillas since late 1985.

Alternate Scenarios. Although we believe that Hanoi will slowly consolidate its grip on Cambodia in the coming years despite the weakness of its client PRK regime, our forecast could be overtaken by several less likely developments:

-         Changes in the Vietnamese leadership are virtually certain before or during the Sixth Party Congress scheduled for November 1986. More pragmatic successors to the aging old guard led by Le Duan might conclude that efforts to develop a credible PRK regime unacceptably hinder achievement of other strategic objectives such as normalizing relations with the West and seeking rapprochement with China. These considerations could lead to a less rigid line on Cambodia that would allow a more rapid or liberal "national reconciliation" between the Cambodian resistance and the PRK than Hanoi would otherwise be inclined to permit.

-         A marked growth in the effectiveness of the Cambodian resistance would delay Hanoi's withdrawal timetable and possibly produce increases in both internal and external—for example, Soviet—pressure on Vietnam to seek an early settlement. The odds of this happening would be better if the performance of the non-Communist resistance under Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk were to improve dramatically. Conversely, if resistance growth were confined to the Khmer Rouge, Hanoi would probably take a harder line to forestall reemergence of what in its eyes would be a Chinese-controlled threat.

-         The emergence of a competent PRK regime able to stand largely on its own and resistant to Hanoi's      dominance. This is a far less likely prospect, in our view. Despite the visceral anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia, we see no current evidence that it can be channeled into the type of opposition that would loosen Vietnam's basic control.

Appendix

Leading PRK Officials

Heng Samrin

Chairman, Council of State (President), since June 1981 . . . KPRP General Secretary since December 1981 . . . member of Politburo and party secretariat, chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council since 1979 . . . President of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense (KUFNCD) since December 1978 . . . top KPRP leader in title, but not in reality . . . joined Khmer Rouge in 1959 . . . by 1975 commander and chief political commissar of Khmer Rouge Fourth Division and deputy chief of staff of Eastern Region . . . led Army uprising against Pol Pot in 1978 . . . native of peasant stock from Prey Veng Province . . . 51 years old . . . married with three children and at least two grandchildren.       

Chea Sim

Politburo member since May 1981, Chairman of National Assembly since June 1981, and chairman of the KUFNCD since November 1981 . . . probably responsible for united front and mass mobilization . . . one of most influential KPRP leaders . . . cousin of Heng Samrin . . . joined anti-French resistance in 1952 . . . elected to Pol Pot's People's Representative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea in 1976 . . . escaped to Vietnam after participating in abortive uprising against Pol Pot in May 1978 . . . former PRK Minister of Interior . . . native of Svay Rieng Province . . . about 54 years old.

Hun Sen

Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) since January 1985 . . . member of Politburo and party secretariat, Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1979 . . . probably most powerful official in PRK Government . . . can be unpredictable and easily angered . . . private person wary of strangers . . . native of peasant origins from Kampong Cham Province . . . broke off studies in Phnom Penh in 1970 to oppose Lon Nol government . . . rose to deputy commander and chief of staff of a regiment in Khmer Rouge Eastern Region by 1977 . . . broke with Khmer Rouge that year and escaped to Vietnam . . . about 35 years old . . . lost an eye from a shrapnel wound . . . married with children.

Say Phuthang [Say Phouthong]

Politburo member and vice chairman of Council of State since 1981 . . . Chairman of Central Committee Control Commission since October 1985 . . . joined anti-French resistance in 1948 . . . sent to Hanoi as a student in 1954 . . . probably returned to Cambodia in 1970 . . . broke with Pol Pot regime in 1974 . . . headed Central Committee's Central Organization Commission 1981-85 . . . a native of Kaoh Kong Province and an ethnic Thai  . . . about 61 years old.

Bou Thang [Bou Thong]

Minister of Defense and a vice chairman of the Council of Ministers since

February 1982 . . . Politburo member responsible for defense since May 1981 . . . member of party secretariat known as "the bulldozer" because of management techniques . . . joined anti-French Issarak Movement in 1954 and left to study in Hanoi same year . . . became Khmer Rouge district commander in northeast in 1970 . . . turned against Pol Pot in 1974 and organized guerrilla movement in northern Cambodia . . . speaks Vietnamese and Laotian . . . about 48 years old. 

Chea Soth

Politburo member responsible for economy since May 1981 . . . Minister of Planning and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers since June 1981 . . . oversees distribution of foreign aid . . . since January 1985, chairman of a permanent subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation between Cambodia and the Soviet Union . . . native of peasant stock from Prey Veng Province . . . joined anti-French resistance in 1949 and studied in Hanoi . . . worked until 1970 for Vietnamese News Agency . . . worked for Khmer Rouge news agency in Hanoi from 1970 until breaking with Pol Pot in 1974 and remaining in Vietnam . . . PRK's first Ambassador to Vietnam, January 1979—September 1980 . . . about 58 years old.    

Men Sam-an [Men Sam An]

Politburo member since October 1985 and most influential woman in PRK leadership . . . alternate member of Central Committee since 1981, full member since 1984 . . . protege of Le Duc Anh, major factor in meteoric rise to Politburo . . . Defense Minister Bou Thang also may be patron . . . has received unusually large amount of foreign publicity as occasional party spokesperson . . . head of KPRP's Propaganda and Education Commission, 1984-85 . . . chairman of Central Organization Committee of party Central Committee since last October, powerful position in charge of building party and making all party appointments. . . joined Khmer Rouge in 1970 . . . studied Communist doctrine in Vietnam . . . in mid-1970s apparently worked as agent in Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge for anti—Khmer Rouge Cambodians . . . after 1979 ouster of Khmer Rouge, served as chairman of a unit in PRK Ministry of Defense . . . about 33 years old . . . married to Peng Patt, who possibly is Vice Minister of Economic Cooperation.

Mat Ly

Politburo member since 1982, probably responsible for mass organizations . . . general secretary of National Council of the KUFNCD since at least 1983 . . . vice chairman of the National Assembly since at least 1982 chairman of the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions since at least 1983 . . . Muslim, native of Kampong Cham Province . . . joined anti-French resistance in 1948, jailed and tortured by French 1950-53 . . . lost numerous family members during Khmer Rouge purge of Muslims . . rebelled against Pol Pot in 1978 and fled to Vietnam . . . served as Vice Minister of Agriculture in 1983 . . . about 61 years old.

Ney Pena

Member of Politburo and party secretariat with responsibility for security matters and Minister of Interior since October 1985 . . . member of Central Committee since February 1985 . . . as of 1981 party congress, held position of vice chairman of Preah Vihear Province's security service . . . as of 1985, secretary of Preah Vihear party committee.