Is Burma the new Cambodia?
Barely two years after a new future appeared within sight, Burma is in danger of losing its way again.
Photo by DiverDave
In
1996, a photograph began circulating among the foreign press in Phnom
Penh. Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s liberal opposition leader, was pictured
sitting with Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon, Burma, where
she was between stints under house arrest. He wore a cloying smile,
clearly pleased at the association. But she remained typically
inscrutable, with one side of her mouth curled in almost patronizing
politeness toward her visitor.
In the newsrooms and
watering holes of Phnom Penh, the two expressions were read as a telling
contrast between “nice guy who’s trying” and “Nobel Peace Prize
winner.” If these two Southeast Asian reformers represented the best
hopes for their troubled countries, most would have put their money on
Suu Kyi and Burma. Cambodia was just three years removed from a historic
United Nations-sponsored election, but it was already sliding into what
one scholar notably described as a “vaguely communist free-market state
with a relatively authoritarian coalition ruling over a superficial
democracy.”
Burma, on the other hand, still seemed to
have a political future worth looking forward to (even if it was under
the name Myanmar), and the unexploited economic potential to back it.
Suu Kyi’s infallible, principled resistance to the thuggish junta made
her country a cause célèbre and appeared certain, even then, to put it
on track for better things.
Just two years ago, that
promise finally felt within sight. Isolated and aging, Burma’s military
leadership had begun implementing its “roadmap to democracy,” with
reformer Thein Sein emerging as the first civilian president in decades.
Suu Kyi and other dissidents were released; she won a seat in
parliament and toured foreign capitals in a blaze of publicity and
optimism. Ordinary Burmese gained impressive new freedoms and the doors
were thrown open to liberalization, investment, currency regulation and
the end of foreign sanctions.
To hear their stories
told this way, these two countries appear to have emerged from economic
and social ruin in very different shape. But while Burma still has
prosperous potential, it’s treading perilously close to Cambodia’s path –
cronyism, corruption, land grabs, social and environmental
exploitation. In the short time since the easing of foreign sanctions
and Suu Kyi’s triumphant foreign tour in 2012, elements of “reformed”
Burma have begun to resemble that ugly characterization of its
neighbour. It may yet end up taking the wrong path unless its foreign
partners, including Canadian investors and political leaders, show the
resolve to demand better.
Land grab
The
paranoid Khmer Rouge shattered the lives and livelihoods of millions of
Cambodians, but its experiments in agrarian socialism had the effect of
a perverse form of environmental conservation. Burmese military rule
left a larger footprint – black-market logging, destructive gem mining
and a cavalier attitude toward delicate ecosystems – but much of the
country’s prime land emerged underexploited due to sanctions, civil war
and the sleepy pace of its ox-cart economy. The sudden embrace of open
markets, growth and resource exploitation has inevitably created Wild
West conditions in the rush to exploit these two Far Eastern “frontier”
states, along with tiny Laos.
Despite
years of advocacy by international NGOs, illegal timber exports
continue to significantly erode the forest cover of all three countries
to feed the needs of neighbouring Thailand and China. In past decades,
this trade fuelled civil conflict; today, it largely benefits Burma’s
powerful military and business elites, working with the regional rubber
firms that have been sweeping across Southeast Asia, acquiring land for
plantations to feed global demand.
Resource extraction,
which was a tricky business for Western firms in Burma under the
watchful eyes of sanctions and Western public opinion, is proceeding
apace, with all that entails. Gems and precious metals continue to leave
a particularly dirty stain. Working conditions have been widely
deplored and the infamous Letpadaung copper mine has tripped up many of
those involved in the project – from former Canadian partner firm
Ivanhoe, which remains locally reviled, to Suu Kyi, who headed an
official committee that allowed the project to proceed against the
wishes of local villagers.
Meanwhile, Burma’s
government is pushing ahead with a panoply of energy projects,
auctioning off oil and natural gas rights to multinational firms and
advancing plans for dozens of new hydroelectric dam projects. For a
country with chronic power shortages, this should be a no-brainer, but
most of the new capacity is for export and the environmental and social
costs of the infrastructure have been exorbitant.
Next Cambodia?
Consider
the massive Myitsone Dam project at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy
River, intended to generate up to 6,000 megawatts of power, most of it
for the Chinese province of Yunnan. Thousands of Burmese were forcibly
relocated and experts warned of widespread environmental and cultural
destruction before the government suspended the project, citing local
sentiment. With the government under intense Chinese pressure, it would
hardly be a surprise if construction resumes following next year’s
elections.
With weak regulations and enforcement
practices, immense environmental and human consequences are already
evident elsewhere in Burma. Villagers, farmers and remote tribes with
traditional land claims, but no formal title, have been forcibly
relocated or marginalized with little compensation or sympathy, and the
country’s vaunted biodiversity is under threat due to habitat loss and
the trade in endangered species. Black-market logging has been
reorganized and legitimized through Rangoon-area ports, which observers
believe allows for the “laundering” of logs illegally cut in disputed or
ethnic-conflict areas – one of the issues fuelling conflict between the
government and ethnic minority groups. Even the feel-good tourism
industry, which has developed at breakneck speed, has brought unexpected
costs, including environmental damage and overdevelopment at Inle Lake,
a world-renowned tourist attraction even in the bad old days.
There
are many similarities to Cambodia, where land grabbing, forced
relocation, exploitative work conditions, corruption and ethnic strife
are familiar parts of the landscape.
Burma “stands at a
crossroads,” says Ali Hines, a campaigner with British-based
environmental NGO Global Witness, which has done high-profile work in
both countries for years. “Either it can continue down the path of its
neighbours – whose limp efforts at reform do little to mask a de facto
policy of land grabbing and cronyism – or it can use its natural
resources to drive the sort of equitable national development that is
needed to set the counter on a more stable, more sustainable course.”
Getting it right
For Canadians who have or want a stake in Burma, these trend lines should be cause for concern.
Will
nascent reforms, such as transparency in oil and gas contracts, be
strengthened and enforced, or allowed to wither on the vine? Will
effective legislation be passed to properly and fairly establish land
title and regulate its use and sale? Will pervasive cronyism and
corruption be allowed to flourish? Will consultation and popular will
play a greater role in weighing the fate of mega-projects like the
Myitsone Dam? Will restrictions on Suu Kyi’s path to the presidency,
currently blocked by junta-era legislation, be lifted – or have her
principles and promise merely been co-opted by a junta with a friendlier
face?
The answers to these and other questions are not
yet certain. But this is where the outside world Burma has been
courting – including Canadian investors, political leaders and even the
public – can make a difference.
Like the leaders of
many emerging quasi-democracies, Burma’s government, military and
oligarchs are walking a fine line with their foreign suitors. In
essence, they say: In order to make money with you, we will undertake an
amount of reform that satisfies your business and political
requirements.
So how badly do we want to make money
with Burma? And what amount of reform will satisfy our standards? These
are the international community’s bargaining chips.
In
Cambodia, where reform has gone so badly off the rails, growth has been
high but the amount of money to be made was still relatively small (its
economy is defined by agriculture, tourism and low-cost labour). But
international standards for reform were similarly low. The defining
issue for Cambodia’s foreign suitors was justice for victims of the
Khmer Rouge regime, responsibility for which was tangled in regional
rivalries and Cold War politics. Prime Minister Hun Sen, in power for
nearly 30 years, has a singular talent for delay and obfuscation, and
the Khmer Rouge tribunal process has been dispensing justice in a slow
trickle for more than 15 years now – just fast enough to keep foreign
aid and investment on the hook.
Bar set low
There
is no similar defining issue to distract the international community in
Burma. But the amount of money to be made is much higher than it was in
Cambodia. The Burmese economy is already twice that size, with a much
richer resource base and four times the population. And Burma’s
sanctions-era business partners (Thailand and China, notably) set a very
low bar for reform. Can Western firms with checkered records of their
own, such as Canadian resource companies, be counted on to raise it?
“Canadians
and Canadian companies are urged to remain vigilant and ensure that
they engage with individuals and companies of the highest ethical
standard … it remains the responsibility of individual companies to
ensure their activities are within legal parameters and beyond reproach
with respect to integrity,” Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and
International Trade Minister Ed Fast advised in 2012, as Canada
announced its intention to open an embassy in Burma.
To
that end, international money has largely been concentrated in
high-profile industries such as oil and gas, tourism and
telecommunications – foreign investments “are largely contracted on the
basis of intentional standards where transparency is not a problem,”
says Derek Tonkin, a former British diplomat who now serves as an
adviser to investment firm Bagan Capital.
But
sustained change will take time and commitment by both investors and
governments. Before they make their money, Burma’s new foreign partners
need to demand more: clear, fair rules for foreign investment and
domestic politics; the disavowal of cronyism and corruption, official
and unofficial; consideration of social and environmental impacts of
potential investment projects; incorporation of best practices and
corporate social responsibility; understanding and accommodation of
local context, culture and relationships.
Although
some (including Burmese-Canadian democracy advocate Tin Maung Htoo)
have argued that the threat of sanctions should be maintained, it’s
clear that Burma is now open for business. Economic opportunities abound
and Canadians can no longer be expected to stay out on principle or
nervousness at dealing with what remains an unsavoury regime. But as
they engage, they need to keep pushing back. They could start by asking
what kind of Burma they want to deal with in the future: another
Cambodia, or something better?
Guy Nicholson is
deputy comment editor at The Globe and Mail. He was foreign editor and
managing editor of The Cambodia Daily in Phnom Penh from 1996 to 1999.
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