It is just that there be law, but law is not justice.
The passing of a law and the proof of its existence is not enough to assure effective resistance to oppression. Some of the gravest violations of rights have occurred within legal frameworks.
When Law Is Not Justice
The Stone / International New York Times | 13 July 2016
This is the sixth in a series of dialogues with
philosophers and critical theorists on the question of violence. This
conversation is with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who is a university professor
in the humanities at Columbia University. She is the author of “An
Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization,” and other books.
Brad Evans: Throughout
your work, you have written about the conditions faced by the globally
disadvantaged, notably in places such as India, China and Africa. How might we
use philosophy to better understand the various types of violence that erupt as
a result of the plight of the marginalized in the world today?
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: While violence is not beyond naming and
diagnosis, it does raise many challenging questions all the same. I am a
pacifist. I truly believe in the power of nonviolence. But we cannot
categorically deny a people the right to resist violence, even, under certain
conditions, with violence. Sometimes situations become so intolerable that
moral certainties are no longer meaningful. There is a difference here between
condoning such a response and trying to understand why the recourse to violence
becomes inevitable.
When
human beings are valued as less than human, violence begins to emerge as the
only response. When one group designates another as lesser, they are saying the
“inferior” group cannot think in a “reasonable” way. It is important to
remember that this is an intellectual violation, and in fact that the oppressed
group’s right to manual labor is not something they are necessarily denied. In
fact, the oppressed group is often pushed to take on much of society’s
necessary physical labor. Hence, it is not that people are denied agency [could it be that problem stems from religious/cultural beliefs, e.g. fatalism or lack of agency in Buddhism]; it is
rather that an unreasonable or brutish type of agency is imposed on them. And,
the power inherent in this physical agency eventually comes to intimidate the
oppressors. The oppressed, for their part, have been left with only one
possible [??] identity, which is one of violence. That becomes their politics and it
appropriates their intellect.
This
brings us directly to the issue of “reasonable” versus “unreasonable” violence.
When dealing with violence deemed unreasonable, the dominating groups demonize
violent responses, saying that “those other people are just like that,” not
just that they are worth less, but also that they are essentially evil, essentially
criminal or essentially have a religion that is prone to killing.
And
yet, on the other side, state-legitimized violence, considered “reasonable” by
many, is altogether more frightening. Such violence argues that if a person
wears a certain kind of clothing or belongs to a particular background, he or
she is legally killable. Such violence is more alarming, because it is
continuously justified by those in power. [Too broad a condemnation]
B.E.: At
least some violent resistance in the 20th century was tied to struggles for
national liberation, whether anti-colonial or (more common in Europe)
anti-fascist. Is there some new insight needed to recognize forces of
domination and exploitation that are separated from nation states and yet are
often explained as some return to localism and ethnicity?
G.C.S.: This
is a complicated question demanding serious philosophical thought. I have just
come back from the World Economic Forum, and their understanding of power and
resistance is very different from that of a group such as the ethnic Muslim
Rohingya [too simplistic a binary] who live on the western coast of Myanmar; though both are already
deeply embedded in global systems of power and influence, even if from opposing
sides. The Rohingya have been the victims of a slow genocide as described by Maung Zarni, Amartya Sen and others. This disrupts an Orientalist
reading of Buddhism as forever the peace-loving religion. Today, we see
Buddhists from Thailand, Sri Lanka and Myanmar engage in state-sanctioned
violence against minorities.
The
fact is that when the pro-democracy spokesperson Aung San Suu Kyi was under
house arrest there, she could bravely work against oppressive behavior on the
part of the military government. But once she was released and wanted to secure
and retain power, she became largely silent on the plight of these people and
has sided with the majority party, which has continued to wage violence against
non-Buddhist minorities. One school of thought says that in order to bring
democracy in the future, she has to align herself with the majority party now.
I want to give Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi the benefit of the doubt. But when the
majority party is genocidal, there is a need to address that. Aligning with
them cannot possibly bring democracy.
However,
rather than retreating back into focused identity politics, resistance in this
context means connecting the plight of the Rohingya to global struggles, the
context of which is needed in order to address any particular situation. Older,
national, identity-based struggles like those you mention are less persuasive
in a globalized world. All of this is especially relevant as Myanmar sets up
its first stock exchange and prepares to enter the global capitalist system.
In
globalization as such, when the nation states are working in the interest of
global capital, democracy is reduced to body counting, which often works
against educated judgments. The state is trapped in the demands of finance
capital. Resistance must know about financial regulation in order to demand it.
This is bloodless resistance, and it has to be learned. We must produce
knowledge of these seemingly abstract globalized systems so that we can
challenge the social violence of unregulated capitalism.
B.E.: What
are the implications when the promotion of human rights is left to what you
have called “self-appointed entrepreneurs” and philanthropists, from
individuals such as Bill Gates onto organizations like the World Bank, who have
a very particular conception of rights and the “rule of law?”
G.C.S.: It is
just that there be law, but law is not justice.
The
passing of a law and the proof of its existence is not enough to assure
effective resistance to oppression. Some of the gravest violations of rights
have occurred within legal frameworks. And, if that law governs a society never
trained in what Michel Foucault would call “the practice of freedom,” it is
there to be enforced by force alone, and the ones thus forced will find better
and better loopholes around it.
That
is why the “intuition” of democracy is so vital when dealing with the poorest
of the poor, groups who have come to believe their wretchedness is normal [CambodianBuddhist fatalism]. And
when it comes time to starve, they just tighten their nonexistent belts and
have to suffer, fatefully accepting this in silence. It’s more than children
playing with rocks in the streets. It takes over every aspect of the people’s
existence. And yet these people still work, in the blazing heat, for little or
next to nothing for wealthy landowners. This is a different kind of poverty.
Against
this, we have this glamorization of urban poverty by the wealthier
philanthropist and aid agencies. There is always a fascination with the
picture-perfect idea of poverty; children playing in open sewers and the rest
of it. Of course, such lives are proof of grave social injustice. But top-down
philanthropy, with no interest in an education that strengthens the soul, is
counterproductive, an assurance that there will be no future resistance, only
instant celebrity for the philanthropist.
Another
problem with these organizations is the way they emphasize capitalism’s social
productivity without mentioning capital’s consistent need to sustain itself at
the expense of curtailing the rights of some sectors of the population. This is
all about the removal of access to structures of reparation: the disappearance
of the welfare state, or its not coming into being at all.
If we
turn to “development,” we often see that what is sustained in sustainable
development is cost-effectiveness and profit-maximization, with the minimum
action necessary in terms of environmental responsibility. We could call such a
thing “sustainable underdevelopment.”
Today
everything is about urbanization, urban studies, metropolitan concerns, network
societies and so on. Nobody in policy circles talks about the capitalization of
land and how this links directly to the dispossession of people’s rights. This
is another line of inquiry any consideration of violence must take into
account.
B.E.: While
you have shown appreciation for a number of thinkers known for their
revolutionary interventions, such as Frantz Fanon, you have also critiqued the
limits of their work when it comes to issues of gender and the liberation of
women. Why?
G.C.S.: I stand
by my criticism of Fanon, but he is not alone here. In fact he is like most
other men who talk about revolutionary struggle. Feminist struggle can’t be
learned from them. And yet, in “A Dying Colonialism,” Fanon is really trying
from within to understand the position of women by asking questions about
patriarchal structures of domination.
After
the revolution, in postcolonial Algeria and elsewhere, those women who were
part of the struggle had to separate themselves from revolutionary liberation
organizations that were running the state in order to continue fighting for
their rights under separate initiatives. Gender is bigger and older than state
formations and its fight is older than the fight for national liberation or the
fight between capitalism and socialism. So we have to let questions of gender
interrupt these revolutionary ideas, otherwise revolution simply reworks marked
gender divisions in societies.
B.E.: You
are clearly committed to the power of education based on aesthetic practices,
yet you want to challenge the canonical Western aesthetic ideas from which they
are derived using your concepts of “imaginative activism” and “affirmative
sabotage.” How can this work?
G.C.S.: Imaginative
activism takes the trouble to imagine a text — understood as a textile, woven
web rather than narrowly as a printed page — as having its own demands and
prerogatives. This is why the literary is so important. The simplest teaching
of literature was to grasp the vision of the writer. This was disrupted in the
1960s by the preposterous concern “Is this book of relevance to me?” which
represented a tremendous assault on the literary, a tremendous group
narcissism. For literature to be meaningful it should not necessarily be of
obvious relevance. That is the aesthetic challenge, to imagine that which is
not immediately apparent. This
can fight what is implicit in voting bloc democracy. Relevant to me, rather
than flexible enough to work for others who are not like me at all. The inbuilt
challenge of democracy – needing
an educated, not just informed, electorate.
I
used the term “affirmative sabotage” to gloss on the usual meaning of sabotage:
the deliberate ruining of the master’s machine from the inside. Affirmative
sabotage doesn’t just ruin; the idea is of entering the discourse that you are
criticizing fully, so that you can turn it around from inside. The only real
and effective way you can sabotage something this way is when you are working
intimately within it.
This
is particularly the case with the imperial intellectual tools, which have been
developed not just upon the shoulders, but upon the backs of people for
centuries. Let’s take as a final example what Immanuel Kant says when
developing his “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.” Not only does Kant insist that
we need to imagine another person, he also insists for the need to internalize
it to such an extent that it becomes second nature to think and feel with the
other person.
Leaving
aside the fact that Kant doesn’t talk about slavery whatsoever in his book, he
even states that women and domestic servants are incapable of the civic
imagination that would make them capable of cosmopolitan thinking. But, if you
really think about it, it’s women and domestic servants who were actually
trained to think and feel like their masters. They
constantly had to put themselves in the master’s shoes, to enter into their
thoughts and desires so much that it became second nature for them to serve.
So
this is how one sabotages. You accept the unbelievable and unrelenting
brilliance of Kant’s work, while confronting the imperial qualities he
reproduces and showing the contradictions in this work. It is, in effect, to
jolt philosophy with a reality check. It is to ask, for example, if this
second-naturing of women, servants and others can be done without coercion,
constraint and brainwashing. And, when the ruling race or class claims the
right to do this, is there a problem of power being ignored in all their
claimed benevolence? What would educated resistance look like in this case? It
would misfire, because society is not ready for it. For that reason, one must
continue to work — to quote Marx — for the possibility of a poetry of the
future.
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