A message for donors to Cambodia
Dear Editor,
Today, Cambodia’s rights record will be reviewed in the framework of
the “Universal Periodic Review” (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council in
Geneva. The UPR is the only opportunity the international community has
to engage on human rights with some states.
But not with Cambodia.
In addition to field presence of the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, frequent reports by the latter and reviews by UN
expert bodies, Cambodia has been on the agenda of the Human Rights
Council (HRC), and that of its predecessor, the Commission on Human
Rights, for two decades.
Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, a Special Representative of
the UN Secretary-General (now called Special Rapporteur) was appointed
to monitor the country’s human rights situation.
The end result was a text that failed to mention human rights
violations for which the Cambodian authorities are responsible, ranging
from arbitrary arrests and violence against peaceful demonstrators, to
brutal forced evictions.
The resolution welcomed “efforts and progress” made by the government
and encouraged it to pursue judicial and land reform. It simply
stressed the need for it to “continue to enhance its efforts to
investigate urgently and to prosecute … those who have perpetrated
serious crimes”.
Think this is strong language? Let us examine previous resolutions on Cambodia, looking at the issue of impunity.
Resolutions adopted in the 1990s expressed “grave concern” about
“numerous violations” and urged the government to address impunity “as a
matter of critical and urgent priority” (1997); stressed that
“addressing the continuing problem of impunity [remained] a matter of
critical and urgent priority” (1998); or “strongly appealed” to the
government to “take all necessary measures” to bring perpetrators to
account (1999).
Resolutions adopted from 2000-2003 expressed “serious concern” about
the prevalence of impunity and called upon the government to “take
further measures, as a matter of critical priority” – the word “urgent”
disappeared. They welcomed “investigations into some cases of
politically motivated violence” (2000) and recognised the government’s
“commitment and efforts” (2002).
The 2004-2005 resolutions welcomed Cambodia’s progress “in improving
its human rights situation” and urged the government to “address as a
matter of priority, inter alia, the climate of impunity” – the word
“critical” disappeared.
Then, 2008-2009 HRC resolutions expressed the Council’s “concern
about some areas of human rights practices” and urged Cambodia to
“continue to address [. . .] the problem of impunity” – what was before a
“climate” of impunity merely became a “problem”.
Finally, 2010 and 2011 resolutions urged the government to
investigate and prosecute “all those who have perpetrated serious
crimes”. The word “impunity” disappeared altogether.
The resolutions were of a merely “technical assistance” character and contained no condemnatory language.
The weak, de-politicised 2013 resolution was the obvious next step.
In fact, by failing to condemn ongoing impunity and abuse of power in
the run-up to last year’s election, and adopting weaker and weaker
resolutions, the international community allowed the continuation of a
system in which, whenever challenged, the Prime Minister reacts by using
the only language he knows: brute force.
What we witnessed in the last decade was merely the illusion of
progress. The relative decline in political violence was due to fear,
not consolidation of the rule of law.
Up to 2003-2004, the most serious human rights violations perpetrated
in Cambodia were related to political struggles – ie, struggles over
control of the state apparatus and the spoil system and patronage
possibilities that come with it.
After that date, once CPP hegemony had been firmly established, most
human rights abuses were committed in relation to economic struggles, as
loyalties had to be bought and cronies had to be fed.
But as CPP rule is being challenged, the regime is proving that it
still regards violence as a legitimate political strategy. They feel
authorised to use the army to shoot at protesters, ban all public
gatherings and detain citizens incommunicado.
And they do so in part because they know there will be no international outcry – only, possibly, more “technical assistance”.
Cambodia’s donors – who are the main sponsors of UN resolutions on
the country – should put their response in line with the political
reality, and that response should not be limited to technical
assistance.
It should involve a full range of human rights tools: monitoring,
reporting and condemnatory stances. This can start today with the UPR.
What Cambodia needs is strong institutions, not strong men. Rule of law will not come as a by-product of technical assistance.
As long as donors will not demand real reform in exchange for aid, there will be no progress.
Human rights are inescapably political. They are about imposing limits on the exercise of power.
In Cambodia, greater respect for human rights, legal safeguards and
checks and balances will mean undermining the regime and its cronies,
whose rule is based on injustice, violence and impunity.
Technical assistance will be no substitute for political will.
Nicolas Agostini
Delegate,
United Nations at the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
Delegate,
United Nations at the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
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