Comment: Why resettling asylum seekers in Cambodia is fraught with risk
By Brian Stoddart, University of Melbourne / SBS | 25 Feb. 2014
Amid the ongoing bad news about Manus Island has come the revelation that the Australian government has approached Cambodia with a view to resettling some asylum seekers in the impoverished nation.
So far,
foreign minister Julie Bishop has provided no public details of the
request; the Greens immediately condemned the idea in line with their
established policy position; while Labor immigration spokesman Richard
Marles said the opposition may be open to the proposal:
We’ve got to see exactly what is being proposed … and the opposition will have a good look at whatever that proposition is.
Despite the lack of available detail, this development raises several issues worth reflecting upon.
Spreading soft diplomacy
In the current financial year, the official Cambodia aid figure
is A$85.3 million (as against $84 million in the previous year). That
figure will leap dramatically should this proposal proceed – as the Papua New Guinea refugee resettlement arrangement demonstrates.
That base figure will be boosted by other special considerations, such as additional payments for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which has faced persistent financial problems
as the ruling Cambodian government seeks to delay proceedings. Former
Australian foreign minister Bob Carr visited Cambodia several times to
announce additional funding.
Australia, along with myriad aid agencies and NGOs around the world,
continue to pour billions of dollars into a troubled country still
trying to deal with its post-Khmer Rouge genocide history and culture.
Relationship implications
Australia’s long interest in Cambodia aside, the Coalition government
will undoubtedly (or should) be thinking hard about the possible
ramifications of this proposed relationship.
The first is that since the widely disputed elections
last year, the Cambodian government – led by prime minister Hun Sen –
has been under pressure for a number of reasons. These include:
- the validity of the country’s democratic process;
- the leakage of aid monies (the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are just two of the most notable agencies trying to confront this);
- the relatively slow pace of development among the bulk of Cambodia’s 14 million population;
- the minimalist progress in vital areas like health and education.
Some aid workers on the ground argue that these things take time
and that Cambodia is at least moving in the right direction. But for
many organisations, the return on investment must be depressingly low.
The Hun Sen government has a complex history. Senior leaders have
roots in the Khmer Rouge, but switched allegiance to Vietnam when that
country intervened [invaded]. More recently – and significantly – the Cambodian
government has become closely allied to China. Australia will be well aware of the strong geopolitical implications of that relationship.
When Cambodia chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) on rotation in 2012, its actions caused considerable friction.
It had a clear adherence to China’s wishes on important matters like disputes over the ownership of islands in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea.
The tension was such that one meeting broke up without a communiqué
being issued for the first time in the history of ASEAN meetings dating
back to the 1960s. This is all on the back of aid and investment sums
from China to Cambodia now in the billions of dollars per year.
Strategic implications
This background alone places the Australian government in an interesting position. There is a prevailing sense
that Australia has lost dynamic interest in southeast Asia generally
and ASEAN in particular. This has prompted calls for that position to be
rectified or to at least provide an alternative to the strong focus on
the United States.
If Australia is to be better placed with ASEAN, a stronger connection
to Cambodia might well be problematic. Cambodia is geographically at
the hub of southeast Asia and has ongoing tensions with countries like
Thailand and Vietnam over border disputes, along with its open support
for China.
There is also the imminent 2015 ASEAN Economy Community agreement,
which ostensibly will open borders on trade and services and other
fields. Cambodia’s position is not strong in this respect given its
tardy growth. And where will China stand on this relationship with
Australia, given that relationship’s own choppy history of the past few
years?
The regional geopolitics are important, then, but rank well behind
the issue of corruption for some observers. Transparency International ranks
Cambodia at 160 of 177 nations in terms of governmental transparency
with a score 20 out of 100. Budget openness is virtually non-existent.
There have long been reports about the scale, extent and networks of corruption at high levels in Cambodia. One Global Witness report received particular attention for its investigation of illegal logging.
A debate can be had about what has to be tolerated in order to make
progress, but the Australian government would surely have to insist on
due process in the allocation of what will be substantial sums of
taxpayers' money if a resettlement arrangement was to go ahead.
That is significant enough. But the consequences of much of the
corruption is ongoing, including widespread poverty, illness, illiteracy
and heavy-handed treatment of the growing labour force. Recent
demonstrations among lowly paid garment factory workers resulted in several deaths after the army was called in.
Conditions in Cambodia remain dire. The average annual income is
about $US835 per year. This is in stark contrast to the vast wealth of
leading business tycoons linked to the government, whose own leaders
have similarly vast wealth.
To transfer asylum seekers into this environment will require
considerable investment as well as constant oversight from Australia
during a period of political fragility in Cambodia.
In these circumstances, it would take an enormous leap of faith on
the part of the Australian government to believe that a “Cambodia
Solution” would be worth the risk and the investment.
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